# Petri Hurtado de Mendoza Scholasticae et morales disputationes de tribus virtutibus theologicis: de fide : volumen secundum (*Scholastic and Moral Disputations on the Three Theological Virtues: On Faith, Volume Second*)

**by Petri Hurtado de Mendoza (Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza), 1631**

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| **DISPUT. XXXVII.** |  | **DISPUTATION XXXVII.** |
| *Utrum sit de fide hunc numero hominem, qui est Episcopus Romanus, esse Papam?* |  | *Whether it is a matter of faith that this specific man who is the Roman Bishop is the Pope?* |
| **1.** PETRO succedunt, qui legitime creantur Episcopi Romani, quaero nunc, utrum, qui nunc existit Episcopus Romanus, tam certo sit Episcopus Romanus, & legitimus Petri successor in universali praefectura, ut nullo modo liceat dubitare eum esse Papam, magis quod non possimus dubitare de aliquo mysterio fidei? quae quaestio locum habet in singulis Romanis Pontificibus a Lino ad Urbanum VIII. utrum fide sit sanctum, Urbanum VIII. esse Papam, sicut fuit Petrus? |  | **1.** Those who are legitimately created Bishops of Rome succeed PETER. I now inquire whether the one who currently exists as the Bishop of Rome is so certainly the Roman Bishop and the legitimate successor of Peter in the universal governance, that it is in no way permissible to doubt that he is the Pope, any more than we can doubt any mystery of faith. This question applies to each of the Roman Pontiffs from Linus to Urban VIII: whether it is sanctioned by faith that Urban VIII is the Pope, just as Peter was? |
| **SECTIO I. Duae monitiones.** |  | **SECTION I. Two Admonitions.** |
| **2.** PRIMO monendum est, legitimum Petri successorem non posse errare in quaestionibus fidei, quando eas dirimit non authoritate privata, sed Pontificia. Quae doctrina est secundum fidem tenenda, quam probat apprime Pater Valentia tomo 3. disput. 1. quaest. 1. punct. septimo, quaest. 6. a 4. 4. & Cardinalis Bellarminus libro 2. de Roman. Pontif. a cap. 12. praecipue autem libro 4. cap. 2. & 3. & quidem haec doctrina facile deducitur ex supradictis; quia Petro collata fuit a Christo potestas definiendi quaestiones fidei, confirmandi fratres in doctrina sana, & pascendi oves; sed Pontifex Romanus succedit Petro in hac potestate: ergo. Quod si haeretici admitterent minorem propositionem huius syllogismi, non esset cum illis novum certamen de consequentia, aut consequenti eiusdem syllogismi: ipsi enim admittunt Catholicam Ecclesiam non posse in his quaestionibus errare: recurrunt autem Novatores ad spiritum proprium, quo singuli iudicant, utrum Ecclesia Catholici consignant eis fideles esse successores Petri: quapropter cum de potestate Petri, & eius successoribus satis disputatum sit, abstineo a longa probatione conclusionis, quia inde petenda est. |  | **2.** FIRST, it must be noted that the legitimate successor of Peter cannot err in questions of faith when he resolves them not by private authority, but by Pontifical authority. This doctrine is to be held according to faith, which Father Valencia excellently proves in volume 3, disputation 1, question 1, seventh point, question 6, paragraph 4, and Cardinal Bellarmine in book 2 on the Roman Pontiff, from chapter 12, but especially in book 4, chapters 2 and 3. Indeed, this doctrine is easily deduced from what has been stated above; because the power of defining questions of faith, confirming the brothers in sound doctrine, and feeding the sheep was conferred by Christ upon Peter; but the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in this power: therefore [he cannot err]. If heretics would admit the minor proposition of this syllogism, there would be no new contest with them concerning the consequence, or the consequent of the same syllogism: for they themselves admit that the Catholic Church cannot err in these questions. However, the Innovators resort to their own personal spirit, by which individuals judge whether the Catholic Church designates to them the faithful successors of Peter. Wherefore, since the power of Peter and his successors has been sufficiently discussed, I refrain from a lengthy proof of the conclusion, as it must be sought from there. |
| **3.** Pono secundo, Summum Pontificem posse considerari, quando eligitur, & adoratur illegitime, vel cum suspicione illegitimitatis: in hoc sensu non est quaestio, quia dum est probabile fundamentum de illegitimitate Pontificis, non potest Fide divina credi eum esse successorem Petri: quia fides divina non potest exerceri, quando est locus haesitationi prudenti, ut saepius ostendi: probabile autem fundamentum occasionem praebet haesitationi prudenti. Quapropter non quiescit Ecclesia antequam, eruto omni dubitandi fundamento, tollantur schismatum occasiones. |  | **3.** I posit secondly that the Supreme Pontiff can be considered when he is elected and acknowledged illegitimately, or with suspicion of illegitimacy. In this sense there is no question, because while there is a probable foundation for the illegitimacy of the Pontiff, it cannot be believed with divine Faith that he is the successor of Peter. For divine faith cannot be exercised when there is room for prudent hesitation, as I have often shown; and a probable foundation gives occasion for prudent hesitation. Therefore, the Church does not rest until, having rooted out every foundation for doubt, occasions for schisms are removed. |
| **4.** Alio modo consideratur Pontifex quando iam legitime eligitur, & adoratur, ut tota Ecclesia illum recognoscat: ut nunc Dominus noster Urbanus VIII. sine ullo controversiae vestigio tenet Christianae Reipublicae clavum, clavemque Petri: est igitur quaestio, utrum credendum sit fide divina, Urbanum Octavum, Clementem Octavum, & alios Pontifices pacifice susceptos esse legitimos successores Petri? |  | **4.** In another way, the Pontiff is considered when he has already been legitimately elected and acknowledged, such that the whole Church recognizes him—as now our Lord Urban VIII, without any trace of controversy, holds the helm of the Christian Commonwealth and the key of Peter. The question is, therefore, whether it is to be believed with divine faith that Urban VIII, Clement VIII, and other peacefully accepted Pontiffs are the legitimate successors of Peter? |
| **SECTIO II Pars affirmans** |  | **SECTION II The Affirmative Position** |
| **5.** DICO, credendum esse fide divina omnes & singulos eiusmodi Pontifices, de quibus egi §.4. esse legitimos successores Petri. Haec conclusio non invenietur expressa in authoribus antiquis, quia forte de illa numquam dubitaverunt, eam supponentes: à multis autem e nostrae Societatis Doctoribus acriter propugnatur, praesertim à Patre Suarez disputat.10. sect.8.num.12. Ubi nostros refert & sequitur: & disput.10.sect.5. Cui sententiae multum roboris dedit Clemens Octavus carcerans nonnullos Doctores, quod oppositum censuerint, eosque iubens Romam ad rationem reddituros illius sententiae, quae illi Sedi fuit digna visa supplicio. |  | **5.** I SAY that we must believe with divine faith that all and each of these Pontiffs, whom I discussed in §.4, are legitimate successors of Peter. This conclusion will not be found explicitly stated by ancient authors, perhaps because they never doubted it, taking it for granted; however, it is vigorously defended by many Doctors of our Society, especially by Father Suarez in disputation 10, section 8, number 12, where he cites and follows our authors; and in disputation 10, section 5. This opinion was greatly strengthened by Pope Clement VIII, who imprisoned certain Doctors for maintaining the opposite view, and ordered them to Rome to give an account of that opinion, which the Holy See deemed worthy of punishment. |
| **SUBSECTIO I Primum argumentum** |  | **SUBSECTION I First argument** |
| **6.** PROBATUR primo, quia nisi fide divina credamus, eiusmodi Pontifices esse legitimos successores Petri, nihil est, quod possimus fide divina credere, atque tota Christiana religio consequentis autem absurditas ex se patet: ergo. Probatur maior: quia non possumus fide divina credere revelationem aliquam factam esse Pontifici formaliter, ut Pontifex est, quin eodem assensu credamus illum esse . Pontificem ; sed nisi fide divina Catholica credamus revelationes factas Pontificibus, qua formaliter Pontifices sunt, non possumus fide Catholica credere mysteria fidei: ergo nisi eadem fide credamus eiusmodi Pontifices esse legitimos successores Petri, non possumus fide divina credere mysteria fidei. |  | **6.** IT IS PROVEN first, because unless we believe with divine faith that such Pontiffs are legitimate successors of Peter, there is nothing that we can believe with divine faith, and consequently the entire Christian religion [would collapse]. The absurdity of this consequence is self-evident. The major premise is proven: because we cannot believe with divine faith that a revelation was made to the Pontiff formally as Pontiff, without in the same act of assent believing that he is truly the Pontiff; but unless we believe with divine Catholic faith the revelations made to Pontiffs as formally Pontiffs, we cannot believe with Catholic faith the mysteries of faith. Therefore, unless we believe with the same faith that such Pontiffs are legitimate successors of Peter, we cannot believe with divine faith the mysteries of faith. |
| Maior patet quia revelatio est locutio Dei ad aliquem : non possumus autem concipere locutionem esse inter duos, quin duos illos concipiamus : unde fit non posse concipi revelationem fieri à Deo Pontifici, quin eodem actu concipiamus Deum, & Pontificem. Minor probatur primò quia omnia mysteria credimus, vel ex Scriptura, vel traditione, vel definitione Ecclesiae; sed omnes hi modi pendent ab assensu Catholico, quo credimus revelationem Dei factam Pontifici : ergo nisi Catholica fide credamus revelationem Pontifici, non possumus credere fide Catholica mysteria fidei. |  | The major premise is evident because revelation is God’s speech to someone: we cannot, however, conceive of speech occurring between two parties without conceiving of those two parties. Hence, it follows that we cannot conceive of revelation being made by God to the Pontiff without, by the same act, conceiving of both God and the Pontiff. The minor premise is proven first because we believe all mysteries either from Scripture, or tradition, or the definition of the Church; but all these modes depend upon the Catholic assent by which we believe God’s revelation made to the Pontiff. Therefore, unless we believe by Catholic faith the revelation to the Pontiff, we cannot believe the mysteries of faith by Catholic faith. |
| Minor probatur, quia omnis Scriptura divina, quae confirmata est authoritate Pontificum admittitur in Ecclesia, ut Canonica quae autem adhuc à Summis Pontificibus non est proposita, ut Canonica, non habetur in Ecclesia pro tali, ut Ecclesiae libri Iudith, & quarti: omnis vero traditio derivata est ab Apostolis, admissaque à tota Ecclesia cum Summo Pontifice : definitionesque Ecclesiae indigent confirmatione Summi Pontificis: ergo non possumus credere aliquod mysterium fidei fide Catholica, quin eadem credamus revelationem factam Pontifici. |  | The minor premise is proven because all divine Scripture which has been confirmed by the authority of the Pontiffs is admitted in the Church as Canonical; whereas that which has not yet been proposed by the Supreme Pontiffs as Canonical is not held as such in the Church, as with the books of Judith and the fourth [Book of Esdras]. Indeed, all tradition is derived from the Apostles and has been admitted by the whole Church together with the Supreme Pontiff; and the definitions of the Church require confirmation from the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, we cannot believe any mystery of faith by Catholic faith without by the same faith believing in the revelation made to the Pontiff. |
| Non est animus probare, non esse alia motiva praeter authoritatem Ecclesiae ad credendum fide divina : nunc enim non disputo de conditionibus ad credendum ; sed de obiecto ipso formali fidei: immo vero de facto, &, ut nunc res sunt dispositae per providentiam Dei, sacrae Scripturae non admittuntur, neque possunt, nisi propter authoritatem Ecclesiae, ut dixit Sanctus Augustinus de Evangelium non crediturus, nisi ad id moveretur authoritate Ecclesiae Catholicae. |  | It is not my intention to prove that there are no other motives besides the authority of the Church for believing with divine faith: for now I am not disputing about the conditions for belief, but about the formal object of faith itself. Indeed, in fact, as things are now arranged by God’s providence, the sacred Scriptures are not accepted, nor can they be, except through the authority of the Church, as Saint Augustine said of the Gospel, that he would not believe it unless moved to do so by the authority of the Catholic Church. |
| **7.** Confirmatur hoc argumentum, quia, verbi gratia, in Eucharistia sola accidentia remanere, & substantiam desinere cognoscimus fide divina propter definitionem Concilij Tridentini confirmati à Pio Quarto: item absolutionem in absentia esse invalidam credimus ob definitionem Clementis Octavi : sacras item imagines esse adorandas credimus propter definitionem Concilij Nicaeni Secundi confirmati ab Adriano: sed nisi credamus fide divina Pium Quartum, Clementem Octavum, & Adrianum fuisse legitimos Pontifices, non possumus credere haec mysteria fidei: ergo. Probatur minor, quia credere est esse proposita per authoritatem infallibilem Summi Pontificis, cui Deus ea revelavit, propter promissionem infallibilem illi assistendi, ne erret: ergo nobis persuademus, eam infallibilem propositionem Pontificis ortam esse a Spiritu Sancto assistente Pontifici, quia Pontifex est. |  | **7.** This argument is confirmed because, for example, we recognize by divine faith that in the Eucharist only the accidents remain while the substance ceases to exist because of the definition of the Council of Trent confirmed by Pius IV. Likewise, we believe that absolution given in absence is invalid because of the definition of Clement VIII. Similarly, we believe that sacred images should be venerated because of the definition of the Second Council of Nicaea confirmed by Adrian. But unless we believe with divine faith that Pius IV, Clement VIII, and Adrian were legitimate Pontiffs, we cannot believe these mysteries of faith. The minor premise is proven because to believe is to accept what is proposed through the infallible authority of the Supreme Pontiff, to whom God revealed these things, on account of the infallible promise of assisting him, lest he err. Therefore, we are persuaded that this infallible pronouncement of the Pontiff arises from the Holy Spirit assisting the Pontiff, because he is the Pontiff. |
| **8.** Quod confirmatur secundò, quia tamdiu possumus dubitare de infallibili veritate propositionis Pontificiae, quamdiu possumus dubitare de legitimitate Pontificis: ergo si absque peccato contra fidem Catholicam possum ego dubitare de legitimitate Summi Pontificis, possum absque tali peccato dubitare etiam de infallibilitate eiusdem propositionis, & consequenter possum dubitare de veritate mysterij revelati, quia careo sufficienti principio ad credendum indubitanter: consequentia patet, quia eodem fundamento nituntur firmitas, aut dubitatio personae, & iuris ipsius personae: si enim ego dubito hunc hominem esse Regem, dubito etiam de obligatione legis ab ipso latae: antecedens probo, quia infallibilitas propositionis Pontificiae cognoscitur oriri ex eius dignitate, & legitima successione Petri: hae enim conditio antecedenter necessaria, non secus quàm dominium alicuius rei est principium necessarium ad valorem alienationis: & quemadmodum Regia dignitas est necessaria ad valorem legum: &, vt dubitamus de omnibus effectibus, dum dubitamus de illorum causis adaequatis, ita dubitare possumus de infallibilitate propositionis, dum possumus dubitare de authoritate Pontificis, sine qua non potest dari causa adaequata eius infallibilitatis. |  | **8.** This is confirmed secondly, because we may doubt the infallible truth of a Pontifical proposition for as long as we can doubt the legitimacy of the Pontiff: therefore, if I can doubt the legitimacy of the Supreme Pontiff without sinning against the Catholic faith, I can also, without such sin, doubt the infallibility of the same proposition, and consequently I can doubt the truth of the revealed mystery, because I lack a sufficient principle for believing without doubt. The consequence is evident, because the certainty or doubt regarding a person and the rights of that person rest on the same foundation: for if I doubt that this man is King, I also doubt the obligation of the law issued by him. I prove the antecedent, because the infallibility of a Pontifical proposition is known to arise from his dignity and legitimate succession from Peter: for this condition is necessarily antecedent, just as ownership of something is a necessary principle for the validity of its alienation, and as royal dignity is necessary for the validity of laws. And, just as we doubt all effects while doubting their adequate causes, so we can doubt the infallibility of a proposition while we can doubt the authority of the Pontiff, without which there cannot be given an adequate cause of its infallibility. |
| **9.** Observa eamdem esse difficultatem de hoc articulo fidei, ac de Conciliis: quia Concilia in probabiliori sententia non habent vim definiendi absque instructione, aut consensu Romani Pontificis: ergo, vt decreta Conciliaria vim habeant, vt credantur fide Catholica, opus est, vt credamus ea confirmari à vero Pontifice: ergo nisi credamus hunc esse verum Pontificem, non credimus hoc Concilium habere authoritatem infallibilem: consequentiam probo ex proximè dictis. Et quamvis demus Concilia errare non posse, nisi faciant aliquid contra consensum, aut instructionem Pontificis, adhuc opus est credere fide divina, hoc Concilium esse legitimum; alioqui, qua ratione dubitatur de eius legitimitate, possumus etiam dubitare de eius infallibilitate: estque fere eadem difficultas credendi fide Catholica, hoc Concilium esse legitimum, quae de hoc Pontifice. Item est eadem difficultas de tota Ecclesia: quae quamvis correspondenter a legitimitate Pontificis in fallibilitate errare non possit, adhuc possumus dubitare, in quibus hominibus sit haec Ecclesia Catholica? ponamus enim illam esse in Episcopatu Romano, adhuc ignoramus, ex quibus fidelibus in particulari componatur: nescimus enim, an sint baptizati; an haeretici animus ut sint? In Ecclesiae Conciliis oportet credere fide Catholica illorum legitimitatem, animumque Catholicum, sic in Romano Pontifice, ne vacillemus in fide, credenda est fide Catholica eius legitima successio Petri. Immo credimus fide Catholica eumdem Petrum, qui fuit Episcopus Romae, fuisse illum, cui Christus dedit claves Ecclesiae: alioquin nihil erit certum: ergo non alia ratione credendum est Paulum Quintum, Clementem Octavum, Pium Quartum, Adrianum Secundum, Urbanum octavum, & alios esse legitime successores Petri. Non consideravit oppositae fraternitatis authores ab illis in dubium revocari authoritatem singulorum Conciliorum, & totius Ecclesiae: de quorum fide interna, & baptismo est eadem obscuritas, quae de Urbano Octavo. Mihi autem satis esse meae sententiae eamdem rationem, quae est caeteris fidei mysteriis pendentibus ab obiectis, & conditionibus obscuris. |  | **9.** Observe that the same difficulty exists regarding this article of faith as regarding Councils: because Councils, in the more probable opinion, do not have the power of defining [dogma] without the instruction or consent of the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, for conciliar decrees to have force, so that they may be believed with Catholic faith, it is necessary that we believe they are confirmed by the true Pontiff. Consequently, unless we believe this man to be the true Pontiff, we do not believe this Council to have infallible authority. I prove this consequence from what has just been said. And even if we grant that Councils cannot err unless they do something against the consent or instruction of the Pontiff, still it is necessary to believe by divine faith that this Council is legitimate; otherwise, for the same reason one doubts its legitimacy, we can also doubt its infallibility. And there is almost the same difficulty in believing with Catholic faith that this Council is legitimate as there is regarding this Pontiff. Likewise, there is the same difficulty regarding the whole Church: which, although correspondingly it cannot err in infallibility due to the legitimacy of the Pontiff, still we can doubt in which persons this Catholic Church resides. For let us suppose it to be in the Roman Episcopate; still we do not know from which particular faithful it is composed. For we do not know whether they are baptized, or whether they are heretics in spirit. In Councils of the Church it is necessary to believe with Catholic faith their legitimacy and Catholic spirit; similarly with the Roman Pontiff, lest we waver in faith, his legitimate succession from Peter must be believed with Catholic faith. Indeed, we believe with Catholic faith that the same Peter, who was Bishop of Rome, was the one to whom Christ gave the keys of the Church; otherwise nothing would be certain. Therefore, for no other reason must we believe that Paul V, Clement VIII, Pius IV, Adrian II, Urban VIII, and others are legitimate successors of Peter. The authors of the opposing brotherhood did not consider that the authority of individual Councils and of the whole Church is called into question by them—concerning whose internal faith and baptism there is the same obscurity as there is concerning Urban VIII. For me, however, it is sufficient that my position has the same reasoning as other mysteries of faith depending on objects and conditions that are obscure. |
| **SUBSECTIO II. Prima responsio impugnatur.** |  | **SUBSECTION II. The First Response is Challenged.** |
| **10.** DOMINICUS Bañez quaest. 1. art. 10. dubitatione secunda principali, versus secundum argumentum, refert a nonnullis celebri credendum esse fide Catholica, eum esse legitimum Pontificem, qui definiat aliquam propositionem credendam fide divina: probat, quia conclusio fidei non potest sequi, nisi ex duobus praemissis fidei, vel altera fidei, & altera cognita lumine naturae; sed conclusio, quam definit Pontifex est certa secundum fidem: quae tamen pendet ex his praemissis: Summus Pontifex errare non potest; hic est summus Pontifex: ergo hic non potest errare: cuius syllogismi minor propositio non cognoscitur lumine naturae: ergo cognoscitur fide. Secundo probat a posteriori, quia qui habet potestatem confirmandi fratres in fide, est summus Pontifex: quod credimus fide Catholica: sed Paullus Quintus confirmat Ecclesiam in fide, ut patet ad sensum; quia fideles, qui ante de aliqua propositione dubitabant, iam non dubitabant post definitiones; quo Paullus Quintus est summus Pontifex. Tertio quia quando summus Pontifex, aut Concilium definiunt aliquid, definiunt simul implicite se habere potestatem definiendi: ergo tunc iam id est fide credendum: antecedens probat, quia alioquin ultima resolutio fidei esset in proprium cuiusque spiritum, & testimonium. Tandem quia non solum est de fide esse Ecclesiam Catholicam, sed etiam eam esse sub vno capite. |  | **10.** DOMINICUS Bañez, in question 1, article 10, in the second principal doubt, regarding the second argument, reports that some believe it must be accepted as Catholic faith that he who defines a proposition to be believed by divine faith is the legitimate Pontiff. He proves this because a conclusion of faith cannot follow except from two premises of faith, or from one premise of faith and another known by natural light. But the conclusion which the Pontiff defines is certain according to faith, which nevertheless depends on these premises: “The Supreme Pontiff cannot err; this man is the Supreme Pontiff; therefore, this man cannot err.” The minor proposition of this syllogism is not known by natural light; therefore, it is known by faith. Secondly, he proves a posteriori, because he who has the power to confirm the brethren in faith is the Supreme Pontiff, which we believe by Catholic faith. But Paul V confirms the Church in faith, as is evident to the senses, because the faithful who previously doubted some proposition no longer doubt after his definitions; therefore, Paul V is the Supreme Pontiff. Thirdly, because when the Supreme Pontiff or a Council defines something, they implicitly define at the same time that they have the power to define; therefore, at that point it must be believed by faith. He proves the antecedent because otherwise the ultimate resolution of faith would rest on each person’s own spirit and testimony. Finally, because it is not only a matter of faith that there is a Catholic Church, but also that it exists under one head. |
| **11.** Haec doctrina a me est impugnata disp. 2.§.39: primum quia aliqua Concilia, & Papae multa definiunt; quin aliquid dicant de sua legitimitate. Secundo impugnatur, quia vel mihi constat legitime de pontificatu, aut legitimitate Concilij; ita vt ante ipsam definitionem sim certus; illum esse legitimum Pontificem, aut Concilium: sic autem non est opus nova definitione, vt ego id credam fide Catholica: si autem antecedenter ad actualem definitionem non sum omnino certus de legitimitate definientis, nihil omnino interest definitio: quia eius vim ego mihi persuadeo, quia intelligo eam esse factam legitimo Pontifici; sed per illam mihi no constat hunc esse legitimu Pontifice; ergo mihi no constat, ea quae videtur confirmatum. Quarto mihi esse controversiam cum aliquo Pontifice de eius legitimitate: & ille antequam mihi attulerit novam aliquam rationem, definiat se esse legitimum Pontificem; eius definitio a me irridebitur, quia cum novam rationem mihi non attulerit, nec eius definitio ea indicaverit: maneo aeque dubius, ac ante tam de legitimitate, quam de vi definitionis. Vide eam disputationem vndecimam §.33. & 34: hanc autem doctrinam tradit Cardinalis Bellarminus, & insinuat Magister Bañez; quibus concludo, certum esse secundum fidem hunc hominem esse legitimu Pontifice antequa definiat, esse legitimu Pontifice; alioquin eius definitio no habebit vim. |  | **11.** This doctrine was contested by me in disputation 2, §39: first, because some Councils and Popes define many things without saying anything about their own legitimacy. Second, it is contested because either I am legitimately certain about the pontificate or the legitimacy of the Council, such that before the definition itself I am certain that he is the legitimate Pontiff or it is a legitimate Council—in which case no new definition is needed for me to believe it with Catholic faith; or if, prior to the actual definition, I am not entirely certain about the legitimacy of the one defining, then the definition is of no consequence whatsoever—because I persuade myself of its force because I understand it to have been made by a legitimate Pontiff; but through that definition it is not established for me that this is a legitimate Pontiff; therefore, it is not established for me what appears to have been confirmed. Fourth, suppose I have a controversy with some Pontiff about his legitimacy: and he, before bringing forth to me any new reasoning, defines himself to be the legitimate Pontiff; his definition will be ridiculed by me, because since he has not presented any new reason to me, nor has his definition indicated such: I remain equally doubtful as before, both about the legitimacy and about the force of the definition. See that eleventh disputation, §33 and 34: this doctrine is taught by Cardinal Bellarmine, and insinuated by Master Bañez; with whom I conclude that it is certain according to faith that this man is the legitimate Pontiff before he defines that he is the legitimate Pontiff; otherwise his definition will have no force. |
| **12.** Quia vero Dominicus Bañez vult non esse fide certum ante, aut post definitionem, hunc hominem esse Papam: respondet caeteris obiectionibus: ad primam propositam §.10. respondet ipse, propositionem esse certam secundum fidem, si a tota Ecclesia acceptetur, quae errare non potest: non vero quod sit certum secundum fidem hunc hominem esse Papam: in fine autem sic verbis ita concludit *Padet non est opus*; quod vt aliqua propositio habeatur certa secundum fidem, colligatur per consequentia ex illo antecedenti: iste est summus Pontifex, & iste definit, & proponit hanc propositionem: ergo est de fide: sufficit enim nobis, quod a tota Ecclesia acceptetur tamquam certa secundum fidem, ut inde possimus colligere, & tenere, illam esse certam secundum fidem. |  | **12.** Since Dominicus Bañez maintains that it is not certain by faith, either before or after a definition, that this particular man is the Pope, he responds to the remaining objections: to the first objection proposed in §.10, he himself responds that a proposition becomes certain according to faith if it is accepted by the whole Church, which cannot err; but it is not certain according to faith that this particular man is Pope. At the end, he concludes with these words, *Padet non est opus* [It is not necessary to be ashamed]; for a proposition to be considered certain according to faith, it need not be deduced by consequence from the antecedent premise: “this man is the Supreme Pontiff,” and “this man defines and proposes this proposition,” therefore it is of faith. It is sufficient for us that it be accepted by the whole Church as certain according to faith, so that from this we may infer and hold that it is certain according to faith. |
| **13.** Haec doctrina nequaquam mihi placet: sed est mihi suspecta; quia enervat Romani Pontificis authoritatem in quaestionibus fidei, quam authoritatem negatam capiti defert membris: Romanumque Pontificem non facit infallibilem regulam caeterorum membrorum Ecclesiae; sed potius caetera membra facit regulam capitis. Probo evidenter, quia hic author distinguit totum corpus Ecclesiae a capite: sic autem dicit rationem, ob quam ego mihi persuadeo aliquam propositionem esse de fide, sumi ex omnium consensione membrorum, & non ex definitione capitis: ergo membra facit regulam fidei, & non caput: probo consequentiam, quia illa est mihi regula fidei, per quam dirigor infallibiliter ad credendum fide divina; sed in hac sententia non dirigor definitione capitis; sed consensione membrorum: ergo haec sententia membra, & non caput constituit regulam fidei: hoc autem, quam sit absurdum, inde constat, quia Petrum, & eius successores constituit Christus ad pascendum totum gregem, & omnes fratres confirmandos: membra vero non constituit, ut pascerent caput, nec confirmarent: manifesteque tollitur ex hac sententia authoritas infallibilis Summi Pontificis. |  | **13.** This doctrine is by no means acceptable to me: rather, it is suspect to me; because it weakens the authority of the Roman Pontiff in questions of faith, transferring to the members that authority it denies to the head: and it does not make the Roman Pontiff the infallible rule for the other members of the Church; but rather makes the other members the rule for the head. I prove this evidently, because this author distinguishes the whole body of the Church from the head: thus he says that the reason by which I persuade myself that a proposition is of faith is drawn from the consensus of all members, and not from the definition of the head: therefore he makes the members, not the head, the rule of faith: I prove the consequence, because that is for me the rule of faith by which I am infallibly directed to believe with divine faith; but in this opinion I am not directed by the definition of the head, but by the consensus of the members: therefore this opinion establishes the members, and not the head, as the rule of faith: how absurd this is, is evident from the fact that Christ established Peter and his successors to feed the entire flock and to confirm all the brethren: He did not establish the members to feed the head, nor to confirm it: and clearly the infallible authority of the Supreme Pontiff is removed by this opinion. |
| **14.** Secundo impugnatur: quia, quando Pontifex definit iure Pontificio, adhibita diligentia consulendi viros doctos, & alia praestandi: cum primum mihi ita constat de hac definitione, ut non possim de ea formidine dubitare, teneor legibus fidei Catholicae illi absque formidine, & Catholice assentiri, antequam videam caeteros assentiri, aut dissentiri: ergo in sola legitima definitione Pontificis est vis me obligans ad assensum Catholicum: ex quo consequenti impugnatur tota haec responsio: quia non ex consensu fidelium; sed ex definitione Pontificis sumitur fundamentum ad credendum Catholice: quod esse non potest, nisi certum sit secundum fidem, hunc, qui definit, esse legitime Pontificem, sicut Bañez vult credendum esse fide Catholica, quia eadem credo hanc Ecclesiam, quae probat definitionem, esse Catholicam: antecedens probo primo, quia in solo Pontifice antecedenter ad consensum totius Ecclesiae, vel est potestas ad definiendum infallibiliter, vel non est? non esse non affirmat Bañez, neque Catholicus ullus: si autem est: ergo cum primum mihi legitime constat de exercitio illius potestatis, teneor illi credere proprium capitare assensum fidei. |  | **14.** Secondly, it is contended: when the Pontiff defines by Pontifical right, having employed diligence in consulting learned men and performing other requisite duties, as soon as such a definition becomes so evident to me that I cannot doubt it with any apprehension, I am bound by the laws of the Catholic faith to assent to it without hesitation and in a Catholic manner, even before I see whether others assent or dissent. Therefore, the power obliging me to Catholic assent lies in the legitimate definition of the Pontiff alone. From this consequent, the entire response is contested: because the foundation for Catholic belief is taken not from the consensus of the faithful, but from the definition of the Pontiff. This cannot be unless it is certain according to faith that he who defines is legitimately the Pontiff, just as Bañez maintains must be believed with Catholic faith, because by the same faith I believe this Church, which approves the definition, is Catholic. I prove the antecedent first because either the power to define infallibly resides in the Pontiff alone prior to the consensus of the whole Church, or it does not. Bañez does not affirm that it does not exist, nor does any Catholic. If, however, it does exist, then as soon as the exercise of that power is legitimately evident to me, I am bound to believe it with the proper assent of faith. |
| Secundo probatur idem antecedens: quia postquam mihi sufficienter constat de legitima definitione Pontificis, aut debeo expectare consensum omnium fidelium, vel Concilium generale; aut non debeo ea expectare? si non debeo: ergo antecedenter ad consensum Ecclesiae credo Fide Catholica aliquam propositionem definitam ab hoc Pontifice, quod negare videtur Banez. Si autem debeo expectare: ergo nullus erit haereticus, quamvis non credat antequam videat consensum omnium fidelium, vel Concilii generalis. Itaque si quis Romae degens, vidit definitionem Clementis Octavi de invalida absolutione in absentia, potuit absque peccato non credere, donec videret totam Ecclesiam consentientem: sic autem & singuli fideles possent non credere, quia singuli possent suspendere consensum, donec illis constaret de caeterorum consensione. Quae omnia per se sunt absurda. |  | Secondly, the same premise is proven: for after I have been sufficiently informed of the legitimate definition by the Pontiff, must I wait for the consensus of all the faithful, or a general Council; or must I not wait for these? If I need not wait: then prior to the consent of the Church I believe with Catholic Faith some proposition defined by this Pontiff, which Bañez seems to deny. But if I must wait: then no one would be a heretic, even though he does not believe before he sees the consensus of all the faithful, or of a general Council. And so, if someone residing in Rome saw the definition of Clement VIII concerning the invalidity of absolution in absence, he could without sin refuse to believe it until he saw the whole Church consenting: thus even individual faithful could refrain from belief, since individuals could suspend their assent until they were assured of the agreement of others. All of which are absurd in themselves. |
| **15.** Tertio a priori quia singuli, & omnes fideles ideo credunt, quia sibi persuadent id definitum legitime a legitimo Pontifice: ergo quamvis consensus totius Ecclesiae possit esse proxime regula fidei, tamen prima regula est definitio Pontificis: consequentia patet; quia consensus Ecclesiae resolvitur in definitionem Pontificis, ut in obiectum prius cognitum: antecedens probo primo ab exemplis, quia antequam Clemens Octavus definiret nullitatem absolutionis in absentia, non consentiebat Ecclesia tota in eam sententiam: multi enim Catholici sentiebant eam absolutionem esse validam: qui vero censebant eam esse nullam, adversarios non perstringebant haeresis nota: at post definitionem Clementis omnes Catholici consensere in eius absolutionis nullitatem, & censent haereticos esse, qui refragentur: quod autem fuit principium in Ecclesia ad hunc consensum praeter definitionem Clementis? Idem dixerim de Sixto Quinto definiente nullum esse eunuchorum matrimonium: censet igitur Ecclesia Catholica se teneri legibus orthodoxae fidei, ad assentiendum Fide Catholica Summo Pontifici legitime definienti: quia sibi Catholice persuadet: illum sic definientem non moveri authoritate sua; sed Dei: Dei vero authoritatem, & revelationem sufficienter apparatam nullus potest Catholice respuere: ergo prima regula credendi in his, quae Pontifex definit, non est consensus fidelium; sed definitio Papae. Consensus igitur fidelium est argumentum a posteriori infallibilis veritatis propositionis definitae: quia cum tota Ecclesia errare non possit, assensus universalis est signum veritatis rei creditae: definitioque Pontificis est argumentum a priori nostri assensus Catholici, qui eam definitionem sequitur, ut obiectum formale. |  | **15.** Third, from the a priori principle, because individual believers and all the faithful believe precisely because they are persuaded that something has been legitimately defined by a legitimate Pontiff: therefore, although the consensus of the whole Church can be the proximate rule of faith, nevertheless the primary rule is the definition of the Pontiff. The consequence is evident; because the consensus of the Church is resolved into the definition of the Pontiff, as into an object known prior. I prove the antecedent first from examples: before Clement VIII defined the nullity of absolution given in absence, the whole Church did not agree on this opinion. For many Catholics believed such absolution to be valid, while those who considered it null did not brand their opponents with the mark of heresy. But after Clement’s definition, all Catholics agreed on the nullity of this absolution and considered as heretics those who opposed it. What principle led the Church to this consensus other than Clement’s definition? The same could be said about Sixtus V defining that the marriage of eunuchs is null. The Catholic Church therefore believes itself bound by the laws of orthodox faith to assent with Catholic Faith to the Supreme Pontiff when he legitimately defines, because it is Catholically persuaded that when he defines in this manner, he is not moved by his own authority, but by God’s. No one can Catholically reject God’s authority and revelation when sufficiently manifested. Therefore, the primary rule of belief in matters that the Pontiff defines is not the consensus of the faithful, but the definition of the Pope. Thus, the consensus of the faithful is an a posteriori argument for the infallible truth of the defined proposition, because since the whole Church cannot err, universal assent is a sign of the truth of what is believed. And the definition of the Pontiff is an a priori argument for our Catholic assent, which follows that definition as its formal object. |
| **16.** Probantur haec secundo, quia diversimode contingit infallibilitas Pontifici & Ecclesiae: neuter enim errare potest, Pontifex non potest errare in definiendo; Ecclesia vero in credendo. Pontifex quidem, quia Christus rogavit ne deficiat eius fides in confirmandis fratribus: cui adid tradidit claves: Ecclesia vero est infallibilis in credendo, quia adversus eam portae inferi non praevalebunt: manet igitur usque in finem saeculi Ecclesia Catholica: quae cum constet membris, & capite, debet integra perseverare capite, & membris: capite quidem influente alimenta doctrinae, membris autem recipientibus: ut ergo Deus infallibiliter assistit Pontifici, ut definiat vere: ita assistit Ecclesiae, ut eam definitionem credat: consentientibusque capite & membris tota viget Ecclesia. Adde quae dixi §. nono, eandem fere esse difficultatem in credendo fide Catholica, in quibus individuis existat Ecclesia, ac quis eius caput: cumque fides singulorum sit occulta, est nova difficultas in credendo fide Catholica, a caeteris eadem fide credi definitionem Pontificis: quia singulorum baptismus aeque est mihi obscurus, ac est baptismus Papae. |  | **16.** These points are proved secondly, because infallibility pertains to the Pontiff and the Church in different ways: neither can err, but the Pontiff cannot err in defining, while the Church cannot err in believing. The Pontiff indeed [cannot err] because Christ prayed that his faith might not fail in confirming the brethren, to whom He handed the keys for this purpose. The Church, however, is infallible in believing because the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Thus the Catholic Church remains until the end of time. Since it consists of members and a head, it must persevere intact in both head and members—the head indeed infusing the nourishment of doctrine, and the members receiving it. Therefore, just as God infallibly assists the Pontiff to define truly, so He assists the Church to believe that definition. When head and members are in agreement, the whole Church flourishes. Add to this what I said in the ninth section, that there is almost the same difficulty in believing with Catholic faith in which individuals the Church exists, as in [believing] who is its head. And since the faith of individuals is hidden, there is a new difficulty in believing with Catholic faith that the definition of the Pontiff is believed by others with the same faith, because the baptism of each person is just as obscure to me as is the baptism of the Pope. |
| **17.** Ad id quod §. 10. obiicitur de resolutione fide in proprium cuiusque spiritum: respondet Banez veracitatem Ecclesiae tandem resolvi in lumen internum fidei, quo singuli fideles inclinantur ad credendum. Quae doctrina a me est impugnata disput. 5.§.37.& disput.13.§. 116. quia ex parte credentis, lumen, & habitus, & actus fidei sunt idem: habitus autem inclinatur ad credendum in genere causae efficientis: quia est principium, activum assensuum: praeter haec dantur congrua auxilia gratiae ad credendum: at vero ex parte obiecti proponitur aliquid credendum circa quod versantur assensus fidei: hoc obiectum includit etiam definitionem Pontificis, aut Ecclesiae: ergo praeter internum lumen, fit fidei resolutio obiectiva in authoritatem Ecclesiae, & Pontificis: hoc vero fieri non potest, nisi fide divina credatur hunc esse Pontificem: ergo. Concludo ergo contra hanc primam responsionem aeque esse certum hunc esse legitimum Pontificem ante, ac post definitionem: at vero contra Dominicum Banez concludo: nihil posse fide Catholica credi, nisi hoc ita credatur. |  | **17.** To the objection raised in §. 10 concerning the resolution of faith into each person’s own spirit: Bañez responds that the veracity of the Church is ultimately resolved into the internal light of faith, by which individual believers are inclined to believe. This doctrine has been contested by me in disputation 5, §.37, and disputation 13, §.116, because on the part of the believer, the light, habit, and act of faith are the same: the habit inclines one to believe in the genus of efficient causality, because it is the active principle of assent. Beyond these, there are congruent aids of grace for belief. But on the part of the object, something is proposed to be believed, around which the assents of faith revolve. This object also includes the definition of the Pontiff or the Church. Therefore, beyond the internal light, the objective resolution of faith occurs in the authority of the Church and the Pontiff. This, however, cannot happen unless it is believed by divine faith that this man is the Pontiff. Therefore, I conclude against this first response that it is equally certain that this man is the legitimate Pontiff both before and after a definition. But against Domingo Bañez I conclude: nothing can be believed by Catholic faith unless this is so believed. |
| **SUBSECTIO III. Secunda responsio.** |  | **SUBSECTION III. Second response.** |
| **18.** SECUNDO responderi potest argumento facto: Pontificis definitionem non pertinere ad rationem formalem fidei; sed tantum esse conditionem, sine qua non, siue applicationem: applicatio uero non est credenda fide diuina, ut late ostendi disputatione 7. sufficit autem ad applicationem necessariam fidei, si tam prudenter proponatur, ut nullus ei prudenter possit dissentire: ut testatur ostendi. Quam doctrinam indicat Bañez uersu, & propter: quamuis non uideatur eam omnino probare, aut improbare. Potestque confirmari, quia multi censent Pontifici definienti nullam fieri nouam reuelationem. |  | **18.** SECONDLY, one can respond to the argument made: That the Pope’s definition does not pertain to the formal grounds of faith, but is only a condition *sine qua non*, or an application. The application, however, is not to be believed by divine faith, as I have shown at length in disputation 7. It is sufficient for the necessary application of faith if it is proposed so prudently that no one can prudently dissent from it, as I have demonstrated. Bañez indicates this doctrine in the verse “& propter,” although he does not seem to either fully approve or disapprove of it. And this can be confirmed because many hold that no new revelation is given to the Pope when he defines. |
| **19.** Nec haec doctrina potest admitti: est enim in Pontifice & Ecclesia duplex authoritas; altera pure humana; altera diuina: humana nihil habet diuinum; sed est doctrina, & authoritas morum: quibus persuadetur homo prudens illos nec fallere uelle, & difficile posse falli: haec autem persuasio est moraliter certa, non physice; sed physice exposita falsitati: quia enim ipsa hominum uoluntas est physice impos mendacii: nec illorum intellectus est incapax erroris: quapropter haec authoritas non pertinet ad obiectum formale fidei; sed ad prudentem eius applicationem. Alia authoritas est diuina; quia Spiritus Sanctus mouet Pontificem in definitionibus tam certo, & infallibiliter, quam Isaiam, & ceteros Prophetas. |  | **19.** Yet this doctrine cannot be admitted, for in the Pope and the Church there is a twofold authority: one purely human, the other divine. The human authority has nothing divine about it but consists in teaching and moral authority, which persuades the prudent person that they neither wish to deceive nor can easily be deceived. This persuasion is morally certain, not physically certain, and remains physically susceptible to falsehood, since human will itself is not physically incapable of lying, nor is the human intellect incapable of error. Therefore, this authority does not pertain to the formal object of faith but to its prudent application. The other authority is divine, because the Holy Spirit moves the Pope in his definitions with the same certainty and infallibility as He moved Isaiah and the other Prophets. |
| **20.** Unde argumentor: propositio Pontificis orta ab hac secunda authoritate est principium obiectiuum fidei: non ut applicatio, ergo ut obiectum formale: probo consequentiam, quia omne obiectum cognitum, aut cognoscitur ut obiectum formale, aut materiale, aut ut applicatio: haec definitio non cognoscitur, ut obiectum materiale: quia ipsa non cognoscitur ex alio obiecto formali prius cognito: neque item est applicatio: quia omnis applicatio ad fidem est pure humana, & quantum ex se est, & physice, est fallibilis, & exposita falsitati, ut abunde dixi ab initio disputationis septimae: eaquepropter applicatio non est obiectum formale fidei; sed conditio sine qua non, quia fides nititur obiecto adaequato formali physice infallibili: superest ergo, ut illa definitio Pontificis sit obiectum formale fidei. |  | **20.** Hence I argue: the proposition of the Pontiff arising from this second authority is an objective principle of faith: not as an application, therefore as a formal object. I prove the consequence because every known object is either known as a formal object, or as a material object, or as an application. This definition is not known as a material object, because it is not known through another formal object previously known. Nor is it an application, because every application to faith is purely human and, as far as it is in itself and physically, is fallible and exposed to falsity, as I have abundantly stated from the beginning of the seventh disputation. For this reason, an application is not a formal object of faith, but a condition sine qua non, because faith relies on an adequate formal object that is physically infallible. It remains, therefore, that this definition of the Pontiff is a formal object of faith. |
| **21.** Quod vero dicitur, Pontifici non fieri nouam reuelationem, si generatim accipiatur, est omnino falsum? distinguere enim possumus duas revelationes: altera est directa de obiecto revelato: quam aliqui dicunt non fieri de novo, quia saltem implicite est facta in Scriptura. Quae sententia mihi non placet; licet enim Deus de novo non revelet aliquod mysterium, cuius cognitio sit necessaria ad salutem necessitate medii; multa tamen revelat, quae expediant ad communem utilitatem, nam aliqui libri canonici non fuerunt admissi in ipsis Ecclesiae natalitijs pro canonicis: postea vero Pontifices definierunt illos esse canonicos: haec tamen revelatio non erat facta prius: sicut nec quod matrimonia Eunuchorum erant invalida, & alia huiusmodi. Saltem negari non potest aliqua non fuisse olim tam expresse revelata, ut non potuerint absque infidelitate negari: postea vero tam expresse revelantur, ut iam licite negari non possint: illa ergo revelatio expressior est, quae fit Pontifici. Quando autem definit, cum fundamento definit: non tamen est necesse, ut id fiat ex Scriptura; epistolam enim Iacobi esse canonicam, ex qua Scriptura colligitur. Quod si Pontifex nunc definiat ultimos Esdrae libros esse, aut non esse canonicos, ex nulla Scriptura id definiet: quid autem prohibet Deum, quae velit revelare de novo. |  | **21.** What is said about the Pope not receiving a new revelation, if taken generally, is entirely false. For we can distinguish two types of revelations: one is direct concerning the revealed object, which some say is not made anew because it has at least implicitly been made in Scripture. This opinion does not please me; for although God may not newly reveal some mystery whose knowledge is necessary for salvation by necessity of means, He nevertheless reveals many things that are expedient for common utility. For some canonical books were not accepted as canonical in the very beginnings of the Church; later, however, Pontiffs defined them to be canonical. Yet this revelation had not been made previously, just as neither was the revelation that marriages of eunuchs were invalid, and other such matters. At the very least, it cannot be denied that some things were not formerly revealed so explicitly that they could not be denied without infidelity; later, however, they are revealed so explicitly that they can no longer be lawfully denied. Therefore, that more explicit revelation is what is made to the Pontiff. When he defines, moreover, he defines with foundation; nevertheless, it is not necessary that this be done from Scripture. For from what Scripture is it gathered that the epistle of James is canonical? And if the Pontiff now were to define that the last books of Esdras are or are not canonical, he would not define this from any Scripture. What, then, prevents God from revealing anew whatever He wishes? |
| **22.** Secunda revelatio est quasi reflexa, quae habet pro obiecto revelationes alias: verbi gratia. Prophetia Isaiae est revelatio Dei de omnibus rebus, quae sunt in libro Isaiae: at vero, quando Pontifex declaravit libros illos esse canonicos, habuit revelationem Dei de authoritate illorum librorum: haec revelatio de novo fit quotidie: nunc enim circa libros Isaiae duo credimus fide Catholica: alterum omne quod est in illo libro; quod immediate creditur propter revelationem Isaiae: alterum est revelatum esse Ecclesiae illum librum esse canonicum, quia, qui id negaret, esset haereticus; ageret enim contra fidem: haec autem revelatio fuit facta Pontifici. Itaque revelatio Isaiae cognoscitur a nobis fide Catholica tamquam obiectum materiale, per definitionem Pontificis, tamquam per obiectum formale: non nego posse etiam cognosci hanc revelationem Isaiae per species immediatas relictas ex primo syllogismo, de quo genere cognitionis egi disp. 7. & 8. de circulo autem vitando egi disp. 15. |  | **22.** The second revelation is, as it were, reflexive, which has for its object other revelations: for example. The prophecy of Isaiah is God’s revelation concerning all things that are in the book of Isaiah; however, when the Pontiff declared those books to be canonical, he had God’s revelation concerning the authority of those books. This revelation occurs anew daily: for now we believe two things by Catholic faith concerning the books of Isaiah: the first is everything that is in that book, which is immediately believed because of Isaiah’s revelation; the second is that it has been revealed to the Church that this book is canonical, because whoever would deny this would be a heretic, since he would act against the faith. This revelation, moreover, was made to the Pontiff. Thus, Isaiah’s revelation is known by us through Catholic faith as a material object, through the definition of the Pontiff as through a formal object. I do not deny that this revelation of Isaiah can also be known through immediate impressions left from the first syllogism, concerning which type of cognition I treated in disputations 7 and 8, and concerning the avoidance of circular reasoning I treated in disputation 15. |
| **23.** Tota haec doctrina confirmatur: quia quando Pontifex definit authoritate Pontificia, oritur definitio a Spiritu Sancto, ut authore speciali tam infallibiliter, ut Spiritus Sanctus fit specialis author illius? non minus quam cum aliquid revelat, aut miraculo confirmat; alioquin non esset infallibilis definitio, nisi Deum haberet authorem specialem: sed haec specialis assistentia consistit in revelatione facta Pontifici: ergo. Probo minorem, quia iudicium illud Pontificis definientis non potuit infallibiliter oriri ex motivis, & coniecturis pure humanis: quia Pontifex non potuit illis magis infallibiliter moveri, quam caeteri Catholici: qui non ita movebantur, quin possent absque infidelitate non moveri. Ponamus enim controversiam esse inter Catholicos de valore absolutionis in absentia: qui asserebant enim valorem, movebantur quidem coniecturis prudentibus, quarum efficaciam absque infidelitatis peccato negabant adversarii: Pontifex ergo illis omnibus consideratis, poterat assentiri absque peccato, cui parti vellet: qui assensus nullo modo esset fidei Catholicae magis, quam in aliis fidelibus, quia quando absque peccato dubitari potest de aliquo obiecto, non creditur fide divina, ut ostendi disputatione undecima sectione quarta. Ergo Pontifex iudicans assensu supernaturali partem, quam definit, movetur alio principio supernaturali obiectivo, quod nihil videtur esse praeter loquutionem instrumentalem Dei, de qua fuse disputavi disp. 13. ab initio. |  | **23.** This entire doctrine is confirmed: because when the Pontiff defines something by Pontifical authority, the definition proceeds from the Holy Spirit as its special author, so infallibly that the Holy Spirit is the special author of it no less than when He reveals something or confirms it by a miracle; otherwise, the definition would not be infallible unless it had God as its special author. But this special assistance consists in a revelation made to the Pontiff; therefore [the doctrine is confirmed]. I prove the minor premise, because that judgment of the defining Pontiff could not infallibly arise from purely human motives and conjectures, since the Pontiff could not be moved by them more infallibly than other Catholics who were not so moved that they could not, without infidelity, remain unmoved. Let us suppose, for example, a controversy among Catholics concerning the validity of absolution given in absentia: those who asserted its validity were indeed moved by prudent conjectures, the efficacy of which their adversaries denied without committing the sin of infidelity. The Pontiff, therefore, having considered all these things, could assent without sin to whichever side he wished. Such assent would in no way be more an act of Catholic faith than in other faithful, because when something can be doubted without sin, it is not believed with divine faith, as I showed in the eleventh disputation, fourth section. Therefore, the Pontiff, judging with supernatural assent the position which he defines, is moved by another objective supernatural principle, which seems to be nothing other than the instrumental speech of God, which I have discussed extensively in disputation 13 from the beginning. |
| **24.** Dices: assensum Pontificum non esse revelationem Dei; sed esse actum fidei ortum a Deo speciali ratione: quemadmodum, quod Ecclesia non deficiat in credendo, est assensus fidei ortus a Deo specialiori ratione, quam in aliquibus fidelibus. Contra: caeteri fideles in his, quae credunt fide divina moventur coniecturis tam prudentibus, ut fidem amitterent, si dissentirentur, aut dubitarent: at vero Pontifex, quando dirimit controversiam, cuius neutra pars credebatur fide divina: non habet coniecturas tam efficaces, ut peccaret non credendo, sicut non peccabant Catholici, qui non credebant: ergo quando assensu supernaturali definivit, habuit a solo Deo diversa principia, quae non potuit habere ex iis, quae in tota Ecclesia gerebantur. Item nulli fideli in singulari infundit Deus actum fidei, nisi per gratiam congruam, cui physice poterat resistere, & per actum falsum dissentire obiecto revelato: quia quamvis circa totam Ecclesiam Deus decreverit, ne fidem amittant, tamen singuli fideles eam possunt amittere. Pontifex autem quando definit, est in singulari determinatus ante cedentem Spiritum Sanctum ad veritatem assensus: utrum vero ad legitimam definitionem sit necessaria ista consultatio, nihil interest: quamvis enim humanae conjecturae sint necessariae; tamen non ut infallibiliter connexae cum definitione Pontificis; sed quia Deus decreverit tunc loqui cum Pontifice, quando ipse prudenter fuerit dispositus, & cognita rei ambiguitate, a Deo petit illustrari: idque spectat ad prudentem administrationem Ecclesiae, ut singuli sibi persuadeant, a Deo implorandam; & obtinendam esse opem, quando adhibita diligenti prudentia, non est spes in humanis. |  | **24.** You may say: the assent of the Pontiffs is not a revelation from God; but it is an act of faith arising from God in a special manner: just as the fact that the Church does not fail in believing is an assent of faith arising from God in a more special manner than in some individual faithful. Against this: other faithful, in those things which they believe by divine faith, are moved by such prudent conjectures that they would lose faith if they dissented or doubted; but the Pontiff, when he resolves a controversy, neither side of which was previously believed by divine faith, does not have such efficacious conjectures that he would sin by not believing, just as Catholics who did not believe were not sinning. Therefore, when he defines something with supernatural assent, he has received from God alone different principles, which he could not have obtained from those things that were being done in the whole Church. Likewise, God infuses an act of faith into no individual faithful except through congruous grace, which one could physically resist and through a false act dissent from the revealed object: because although God has decreed concerning the whole Church that they should not lose faith, nevertheless individual faithful can lose it. The Pontiff, however, when he defines, is individually determined by the preceding Holy Spirit to the truth of assent. Whether this consultation is necessary for a legitimate definition is of no consequence: for although human conjectures are necessary, they are not infallibly connected with the definition of the Pontiff; but because God has decreed to speak with the Pontiff when he has been prudently disposed, and having recognized the ambiguity of the matter, asks to be enlightened by God. And this pertains to the prudent administration of the Church, so that individuals may persuade themselves that aid from God is to be implored and obtained when, after diligent prudence has been applied, there is no hope in human means. |
| **25.** Praeterea confirmo definitionem legitimam Pontificis esse revelationem Dei: quia illa habet aliquid supernaturale, ut constat ex Catholicis omnibus, (cum quibus disputo): ergo creditur per habitum supernaturalem: quia omne objectum supernaturale petit ad proportionatam cognitionem sui, ut cognoscatur per habitum supernaturalem; sed ille habitus, quo creditur est fides Catholica: ergo illa definitio petit credi fide Catholica: ergo est revelatio Dei: probo consequentiam, quia omne objectum fidei Catholicae, vel est mysterium revelatum, vel est authoritas Dei, vel est revelatio Dei: haec autem definitio non est objectum revelatum, quia non cognoscitur ex alia, nec est authoritas Dei: ergo est revelatio Dei: & quidem cum Caiphas prophetaverit, quia erat Pontifex anni illius, mirum esset nostris Pontificibus negare prophetiam, quae formaliter est revelatio. |  | **25.** Furthermore, I confirm that the legitimate definition of a Pontiff is a revelation from God: because it possesses something supernatural, as is agreed upon by all Catholics (with whom I am disputing): therefore it is believed through a supernatural habit: since every supernatural object requires, for its proportionate cognition, that it be known through a supernatural habit; but that habit, by which it is believed, is the Catholic faith: therefore that definition demands to be believed by Catholic faith: therefore it is a revelation from God: I prove the consequent, because every object of Catholic faith is either a revealed mystery, or the authority of God, or a revelation from God: this definition, however, is not a revealed object, because it is not known from another, nor is it the authority of God: therefore it is a revelation from God: and indeed, since Caiaphas prophesied because he was the Pontiff of that year, it would be strange to deny to our Pontiffs prophecy, which is formally revelation. |
| **26.** Objicies; assensus supernaturalis cujusque fidelis petit ex se cognosci habitu supernaturali fidei: cum tamen non sit revelatio omnis actus fidei. Respondeo, actus fidei in singulari non posse cognosci fide Catholica, neque in via habitu infuso lege communi: quia cum singuli fideles possint errare, non habemus conjecturas moraliter infallibiles, quibus manuducamur ad assensum supernaturalem de illorum fide: esse autem fidem Catholicam in tota Ecclesia, cognoscitur per fidem, ut objectum materiale cognitum per aliquam revelationem factam in singulari alicui Pontifici. At vero quando relinquuntur species fidei in Ecclesia existentis, non exercetur per illas fides Catholica: quia omnis fides in Deum est de objecto formali, quod includat revelationem instrumentalem, aut formalem Dei; sed multi sunt actus fidei infusae, qui non sunt revelatio formalis, aut instrumentalis Dei: ergo fides illos non considerat, ut objectum formale. At vero cum in singulari definitio supernaturalis Pontificis petat, & debeat credi a fidelibus, non relinquitur alius habitus supernaturalis, per quem id fiat, praeter fidem: unde redit argumentum capitis: Fide Catholica credimus illam esse revelationem Dei ad Pontificem: ergo fide Catholica credimus hunc esse Pontificem: e quibus respondeo ad 5. decimum octavum, applicationem revelationis non esse credendam fide divina: est tamen ea credendum, Deum revelare huic homini hoc mysterium, quia Pontifex est: ut credo Incarnationem revelatam Isaiae, vel saltem, Deum specialiter, & infallibiliter assistere huic homini Pontifici; eius autem Pontificatum certo non scio, nisi ex Scriptura: ut dicam §. 42. |  | **26.** You will object: the supernatural assent of any faithful person seeks by its nature to be known through the supernatural habit of faith, even though not every act of faith is a revelation. I respond that acts of faith in particular cases cannot be known through Catholic faith, nor in this life through infused habit according to common law: because since individual faithful can err, we do not have morally infallible indicators by which we are led to supernatural assent regarding their faith. However, that Catholic faith exists in the whole Church is known through faith, as a material object known through some revelation made particularly to a certain Pontiff. But when the appearances of faith existing in the Church are left behind, Catholic faith is not exercised through them: because all faith in God concerns a formal object that includes either instrumental or formal revelation from God; but there are many acts of infused faith which are neither formal nor instrumental revelation from God: therefore faith does not consider them as a formal object. But when in a particular case the supernatural definition of the Pontiff demands and ought to be believed by the faithful, there remains no other supernatural habit through which this may occur, except faith: hence the argument of the chapter returns: By Catholic faith we believe that to be the revelation of God to the Pontiff; therefore by Catholic faith we believe this man to be the Pontiff. From which I respond to the fifth and eighteenth, that the application of revelation need not be believed by divine faith: yet by faith it must be believed that God reveals this mystery to this man because he is Pontiff; just as I believe the Incarnation was revealed to Isaiah, or at least, that God specially and infallibly assists this man who is Pontiff. However, I do not know his Pontificate with certainty except from Scripture, as I will say in § 42. |
| **SUBSECTIO IIII. Responsio tertia.** |  | **SUBSECTION IIII. Third Response.** |
| **27.** TERTIO responderi potest, posse aliquem dubitare de veritate propositionis definitae a Pontifice; non quod dubitet de veritate omnis propositionis definitae a legitimo Pontifice; sed quia dubitat de legitimitate huius Pontificis. Quemadmodum qui credit fide Catholica, omnem hominem esse conceptum in peccato originali, dubitat utrum hoc individuum sit in peccato conceptum, quia dubitat an sit homo? hic non sit haereticus: ergo eadem ratione non erit haereticus, qui dubitans de legitimitate cuius Pontificis, dubitat de eius definitione. |  | **27.** THIRDLY, it can be answered that someone may doubt the truth of a proposition defined by a Pope; not because they doubt the truth of every proposition defined by a legitimate Pope, but because they doubt the legitimacy of this particular Pope. Just as one who believes with Catholic faith that every human being is conceived in original sin may doubt whether this particular individual was conceived in sin, because they doubt whether this is truly a human being—such a person would not be a heretic: therefore, by the same reasoning, one who doubts the definition of a particular Pope because they doubt his legitimacy would not be a heretic. |
| **28.** Contra: quando non est fundamentum probabile ad dubitandum de legitimitate Pontificis, tenemur legibus fidei credere absque formidine, illum esse Pontificem: ergo tenemur etiam credere absq; formidine eius definitionis. Probo antecedens, quia tunc tenemur legibus fidei credere absque formidine, quando ex non credendo destruitur totum obiectum fidei; sed totum obiectum fidei destruitur, quando sine fundamento dubitamus de legitimitate Pontificis: ergo tenemur credere absque formidine illum esse Pontificem, quando non est probabile fundamentum oppositi: maior non indiget probatione; quia si fidem aliquam in fidei regulam coelorum, non possumus licite occasionem dare fidem eradicandi: minor probatur, quia si dubitamus de legitimitate Pontificis, nihil possumus credere fide divina, neque in speciali, neque in communi: quia omnia, quae Catholice credimus, dependent ab aliqua definitione Pontificis Romani, qui vel sacros libros probavit, vel traditionem admisit, vel Concilia confirmavit, vel aliquid definivit. Itaque, qui dubitaret de legitimitate Pii Quarti, qui confirmavit Concilium Tridentinum, dubitare etiam poterit de veritate huius propositionis: *In Eucharistia, sola remanent accidentia panis, & vini*: quia haec veritas confirmata fuit a Pio Quarto. |  | **28.** Objection: when there is no probable basis for doubting the legitimacy of the Pontiff, we are bound by the laws of faith to believe without hesitation that he is the Pontiff; therefore, we are also bound to believe his definitions without hesitation. I prove the antecedent, because we are bound by the laws of faith to believe without hesitation when, by not believing, the entire object of faith is destroyed; but the entire object of faith is destroyed when we doubt the legitimacy of the Pontiff without foundation; therefore, we are bound to believe without hesitation that he is the Pontiff when there is no probable basis for the opposite position. The major premise needs no proof, because if we place any faith in the rule of faith of the heavens, we cannot licitly give occasion to uprooting the faith. The minor premise is proved because if we doubt the legitimacy of the Pontiff, we cannot believe anything by divine faith, neither in particular nor in general: because everything that we believe as Catholics depends on some definition of the Roman Pontiff, who either approved the sacred books, or admitted tradition, or confirmed Councils, or defined something. Thus, one who would doubt the legitimacy of Pius IV, who confirmed the Council of Trent, might also doubt the truth of this proposition: *In the Eucharist, only the accidents of bread and wine remain*; because this truth was confirmed by Pius IV. |
| **29.** Confirmatur, quia eadem ratione, qua aliquis dubitat sine fundamento probabili de legitimitate Pauli Quinti, poterit etiam dubitare de legitimitate Pii Quarti; immo & singulorum omnium Pontificum: unde nihil credet fide divina. Quapropter non solum tenemur exercere hunc actum fidei: *haec definitio est vera, si hic est verus Pontifex*; sed etiam hunc, *hic est verus Pontifex, & eius definitio vera*: quia tenemur ad actus absolutos fidei, & ad omnia per se ad illos necessaria. |  | **29.** This is confirmed because, by the same reasoning by which someone doubts without probable foundation the legitimacy of Paul V, he could also doubt the legitimacy of Pius IV; indeed, even each and every one of the Pontiffs: whence he would believe nothing by divine faith. Therefore, we are bound not only to exercise this act of faith: *this definition is true, if this is the true Pontiff*; but also this one, *this is the true Pontiff, and his definition is true*: because we are bound to absolute acts of faith, and to all things necessary per se for those acts. |
| **30.** Ad argumentum ex §. 17. respondetur, ad dubitandum absque peccato infidelitatis requiri, vt sit aliquod fundamentum probabile oppositi: verbi gratia, vt aliquis non credat absque peccato infidelitatis, hoc individuum esse conceptum in peccato originali, opus est, vt habeat aliquod fundamentum, quod sibi probabiliter persuadeat, hoc individuum non esse hominem quod fundamentum non reperiatur in caeteris individuis, qui homines videntur. Quod si absque fundamento id sibi persuaderet, peccat contra fidem (si intellectu polleat) quia eodem modo posset negare conceptum esse de in peccato originali quodcumque individuum quod appareat homo; vel saltem cum vrget praeceptum affirmativum credendi, *omnem hominem esse in peccato conceptum*, tenetur credere de Petro, quem evidenter videt contineri in eo subiecto, *omnis homo*. Et quamvis posset de vno individuo absque infidelitate dubitari, non est de aliquo Romano Pontifice discrimen est, quia quamvis negetur de vno individuo, non tollitur fundamentum fidei; quia integra manet definitio vniversalis Pontificis: at vero quando absque fundamento dubitatur de legitimitate Pontificis, destruitur fundamentum credendi propositionem definitam. |  | **30.** In response to the argument from §. 17, it is answered that to doubt without the sin of infidelity requires that there be some probable foundation for the opposing view: for example, for someone to disbelieve without the sin of infidelity that a particular individual was conceived in original sin, it is necessary that one have some foundation that persuades oneself with probability that this individual is not human—a foundation which is not found in other individuals who appear to be human. If one were to persuade oneself of this without foundation, one sins against the faith (if one possesses intellect) because in the same manner one could deny that any individual who appears human was conceived in original sin; or at least when the affirmative precept to believe that *every human is conceived in sin* urges, one is bound to believe this of Peter, whom one evidently sees is contained in that subject, *every human*. And although it might be possible to doubt about one individual without infidelity, there is a distinction regarding any Roman Pontiff, because although one may deny something of one individual, the foundation of faith is not removed, since the universal definition of the Pontiff remains intact; but when one doubts the legitimacy of a Pontiff without foundation, the basis for believing a defined proposition is destroyed. |
| **SUBSECTIO V. Secundum argumentum.** |  | **SUBSECTION V. Second argument.** |
| **31.** ARGUMENTUM secundum est confirmatio primi: aut ego mihi possum licite persuadere hunc hominem, licet definitione errare potuisse; aut non possum id mihi persuadere: si possum absque peccato id mihi persuadere: ergo etiam mihi persuadere possum licite definitionem huius Pontificis esse contingentem ad veritatem, & falsitatem; ac propterea illam non possum credere fide divina Catholica, ut saepe dixi; si vero non possum licite id mihi persuadere: ergo fide divina credo hunc hominem esse Pontificem: probo consequentiam, quia ideo credo hunc hominem falli non posse, quia credo illi assistere Spiritum Sanctum, ut Pontifici. Hoc argumentum est commune contra opinantes §. 18. non posse fieri Pontifici revelationem novam: nam habet enim Pontifex infallibilem assistentiam Dei, ita ut ratione illius non possit errare, idque credimus fide divina, ut articulum revelatum: itaque non possumus dubitare de infallibili assistentia Dei. |  | **31.** The SECOND ARGUMENT is a confirmation of the first: either I can legitimately persuade myself that this man, though by definition, could have erred; or I cannot persuade myself of this. If I can persuade myself of this without sin, then I can also legitimately persuade myself that the definition of this Pontiff is contingent regarding truth and falsehood; and consequently I cannot believe it with divine Catholic faith, as I have often said. But if I cannot legitimately persuade myself of this, then I believe with divine faith that this man is the Pontiff. I prove the consequence: because I believe this man cannot err precisely because I believe the Holy Spirit assists him as Pontiff. This argument is common against those who hold the opinion stated in §. 18, that no new revelation can be made to the Pontiff: for indeed the Pontiff has the infallible assistance of God, such that by reason of this he cannot err, and we believe this with divine faith, as a revealed article. Therefore, we cannot doubt the infallible assistance of God. |
| **32.** Dices primo, nos non posse dubitare de veritate huius definitionis, quia licet non sit verus Pontifex; tamen, quia verus apparet, illi assistit Spiritus Sanctus. Quae doctrina similis est alii, quam ex Bellarmino retuli disputatione undecima, §. 30. nempe ad legitimitatem Concilii sufficere Conciliarios externe esse Catholicos, quamvis interne non sit. Eam tamen ibi reieci, quia nullum est fundamentum in Scriptura, quo colligamus Spiritum Sanctum infallibiliter assistere Pseudo-Pontifici: Petro enim & eius successoribus promisit Christus eam assistentiam; non vero non successoribus. Deinde: ergo iam de fide est hunc esse legitimum successorem Petri in potestate definiendi. Tandem sicut consecratio facta a Sacerdote apparente tantum, & absolutio, & alia id genus nullam habent vim; ita nec definitio a Pseudo-Pontifice vim habet. Quapropter Pater Suarez disputat. 10. sect. 5. num. 4. recte ait, qui hoc dicunt, & terminos ignorare, (quia infallibilis assistentia Dei promissa est Pontifici successori Petri, & non diabolo, aut non baptizato, si eligatur) & nos eadem difficultate implicari. Non enim sciunt hunc esse rite electum: quia voluntas illegitima electorum tam est occulta, ac huius hominis baptismus: ut ergo de illa sumus certis ita & de baptismo, & aliis conditio-nibus occultis, & sic credimus Ecclesiam Regi a vero Pontifice. |  | **32.** You may say first that we cannot doubt the truth of this definition because, although he may not be a true Pontiff, nevertheless, because he appears to be true, the Holy Spirit assists him. This doctrine is similar to another which I reported from Bellarmine in the eleventh disputation, §. 30, namely that for the legitimacy of a Council it suffices that the Council members be externally Catholic, even if internally they are not. However, I rejected that doctrine there because there is no foundation in Scripture from which we might gather that the Holy Spirit infallibly assists a Pseudo-Pontiff: for Christ promised that assistance to Peter and his successors, not to those who are not successors. Furthermore: this would mean it is already a matter of faith that this person is the legitimate successor of Peter in the power of defining. Finally, just as consecration performed by someone who only appears to be a Priest, and absolution, and other such things of this kind have no power; so too a definition by a Pseudo-Pontiff has no power. Therefore Father Suarez in disputation 10, section 5, number 4, rightly says that those who claim this both ignore the proper terms (because God’s infallible assistance is promised to the Pontiff who is Peter’s successor, and not to the devil or to an unbaptized person, if such were elected) and entangle us in the same difficulty. For they do not know that this person has been properly elected: because the illegitimate will of the electors is just as hidden as this man’s baptism. Therefore, just as we are certain about the former, so also about his baptism and other hidden conditions, and thus we believe the Church is governed by a true Pontiff. |
| **33.** Dices secundo: nos non posse dubitare de veritate propositionis definitae, quamvis possimus dubitare de legitimitate Ponti-ficis: quia quamvis credamus illum erra-re posse ob illegimitatem, tamen numquam eius error in definiendo redundabit in Ec-clesiam, quia vel non definiet, vel defi-niet verum, vel si falsum definiat, non re-cipietur ab Ecclesia; sed revelabitur error definitionis, vel definientis, & hoc ci-tra miraculum fiet ex promissione Chri-sti, *Et portae inferi non praevalebunt adversus eam*. Sic respondet Dominicus Bañez ex propria sententia art. 10. dubio 2. versus ad secundum. |  | **33.** You may say secondly: we cannot doubt the truth of a proposition that has been defined, although we may doubt the legitimacy of the Pontiff, because even if we believe he can err due to illegitimacy, nevertheless his error in defining will never redound to the Church, because either he will not define, or he will define what is true, or if he defines falsehood, it will not be received by the Church; but the error of the definition, or of the one defining, will be revealed, and this will occur without miracle by the promise of Christ, *And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*. Thus responds Dominicus Bañez from his own opinion in article 10, doubt 2, toward the second objection. |
| **34.** Quem tamen inconsequentiae arguo, quia ipse censet post definitionem Pontifi-cis adhuc non esse de fide eum esse Ponti-ficem; sed oppositum colligitur ex hac do-ctrina: ergo. Probo minorem, quia dum post definitionem Deus non revelat defini-tionis falsitatem, neque definientis illegi-timitatem, signum est & definitionem esse veram, & Pontificem legitimum esse: hoc fundamentum non erat ante definitionem: ergo non est tam certum nunc esse Pontifi-cem ante definitionem, quam post: quia ante definitionem non est necesse, ut Deus revelet vel falsitatem definitionis, vel defi-nientis: at vero post definitionem est ea ne-cessitas: ergo. |  | **34.** Yet I argue that he is inconsistent, because he himself holds that even after a definition by the Pontiff, it is still not a matter of faith that he is the Pontiff; but the opposite is gathered from this doctrine: therefore. I prove the minor premise, because while after a definition God does not reveal the falsity of the definition, nor the illegitimacy of the one defining, it is a sign both that the definition is true and that the Pontiff is legitimate: this foundation did not exist before the definition: therefore it is not as certain now that he is Pontiff before the definition as after it: because before the definition it is not necessary that God reveal either the falsity of the definition or of the one defining: but after the definition there is such necessity: therefore. |
| **35.** Item est alia inconsequentia: quia ip-se fatetur falsitatem definitionis revela-tam iri Ecclesiae, ne portae inferi adver-sus eam praevaleant; sed eadem ratio est de revelanda falsitate Pontificis: ergo. Pro-bo minorem, quia promissio Ecclesiae de portis inferi non praevalituris adversus eam, facta est ipsi Ecclesiae, ut est admi-nistrata per successorem Petri: *Tu es enim Petrus, & super hanc Petram aedificabo Eccle-siam meam: & portae inferi non praevalebunt* caussa igitur, ob quam semper vincet Ec-clesia est, quia illi praeest Petrus: ne igi-tur per PseudoPontificem careat praesi-dio Petri, revelabit illi Deus illegitima-tem Pontificis: nullum quidem discrimen reddet hic author: cuius caeteram doctri-nam percurramus. |  | **35.** Likewise, there is another inconsistency: because he himself admits that the falsity of a definition will be revealed to the Church, lest the gates of hell prevail against it; but the same reasoning applies to revealing the falsity of a Pontiff: therefore [the conclusion follows]. I prove the minor premise, because the promise to the Church that the gates of hell would not prevail against it was made to the Church itself, as it is administered through the successor of Peter: *For thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church: and the gates of hell shall not prevail*. The reason, therefore, why the Church will always triumph is because Peter presides over it. Thus, lest the Church be deprived of Peter’s protection through a Pseudo-Pontiff, God will reveal to it the illegitimacy of such a Pontiff. Indeed, this author will offer no distinction [on this matter]: let us examine the rest of his doctrine. |
| **36.** Dicit falsum Pontificem nihil definitu-rum. Bene: pone si definiat, ipsa defi-nitione efficitur, ut fide credamus eum es-se Pontificem legitimum: probo conse-quentiam, quia per te definitio est proprius character Pontificis veri; qui character nullo modo est in PseudoPontifice: ergo post definitionem maius fundamentum est ad credendum hunc esse Pontificem, quam ante. Deinde cur non definiet? an quia non habet ius ad definiendum? at non habet ius ad definiendum cum assistentia Spiritus Sancti: sine illa vero cur non definiet. Quod si dicas providentia Dei impediendam definitionem, cur non dices eadem providentia efficiendum, ne a tota Ecclesia acceptetur Pseudopontifex pro legitimo: hanc enim promissionem sonant verba Christi de promissione aedificii Ecclesiae supra Petram. Idem duo ad aliam partem doctrinae, quam impugno: si enim est Pontifex illegitimus, cur necessario definiet verum? si est ex providentia Dei, multo melius intelligitur illa providentia in prohibenda acceptatione Pontificis illegitimi. |  | **36.** He says that a false Pontiff will define nothing. Very well: suppose he does define something; by this very definition, we are made to believe by faith that he is the legitimate Pontiff. I prove the consequence, because according to you, the definition is the proper characteristic of a true Pontiff; which characteristic is in no way present in a Pseudo-Pontiff. Therefore, after the definition, there is a stronger foundation for believing this person to be the Pontiff than before. Furthermore, why would he not define? Is it because he has no right to define? But he has no right to define with the assistance of the Holy Spirit; yet why would he not define without that assistance? But if you say that divine providence will impede such a definition, why would you not say that by the same providence it would be ensured that a Pseudo-pontiff is not accepted by the whole Church as legitimate? For the words of Christ concerning the promise of building the Church upon Peter signify this promise. The same applies to the other part of the doctrine which I am opposing: for if he is an illegitimate Pontiff, why would he necessarily define what is true? If it is by God’s providence, that providence is much better understood as prohibiting the acceptance of an illegitimate Pontiff. |
| **37.** Peius est, quod postea dicit, ab Ecclesia non accipiendam definitionem Pontificis; sed illi a Deo oppositum revelandum: etenim deducit authoritatem controversiarum fidei non ad caput; sed ad membra, ut ostendi §. 13. ibique impugnavi. Deinde non tolleretur schismatum occasio, ut voluit S. Hieronymus: quia eiusmodi Pontifex arbitraretur se definivisse iure Pontificio: cuius definitionem inculpate sequerentur infiniti Catholici: adversarii autem iure pro haereticis punirentur ab eodem Pontifice, & eius sectatoribus: arbitrantibus nullam adversarios posse habere revelationem oppositam: quia merito arbitraretur Pontificem legitime definivisse: melius ergo Dominicus Bañez constituisset specialem providentiam Dei, in non acceptando Pseudo-Pontifice, quam in eius definitionibus reiiciendis, postquam est acceptatus. Mitto multa alia, quae miscet, quae ex dictis facilia sunt impugnata. Argumentum a priori proponam, §. 41. illum consule. |  | **37.** What he says afterward is worse, that a definition of the Pontiff should not be accepted by the Church; but that the opposite would be revealed to the Church by God: for he derives the authority in controversies of faith not from the head, but from the members, as I have shown in §. 13, where I refuted this. Furthermore, the occasion for schisms would not be removed, as St. Jerome intended: because such a Pontiff would consider that he had defined by Pontifical right: and countless Catholics would blamelessly follow his definition; while opponents would rightfully be punished as heretics by the same Pontiff and his followers, who would judge that the opponents could have no revelation to the contrary, because they would reasonably consider that the Pontiff had defined legitimately. Dominic Bañez would therefore have done better to establish a special providence of God in not accepting a Pseudo-Pontiff, rather than in rejecting his definitions after he has been accepted. I omit many other things that he mixes in, which are easily refuted from what has been said. I will propose an a priori argument in §. 41; consult it. |
| **SECTIO. III. Opposita sententia.** |  | **SECTION III. The Opposing Opinion.** |
| **38.** NON esse fide Catholica credendum hunc Pontificem esse legitimum perspicue docuit Caietanus 2.2. quaest. 1. art. 3. versu: *in responsione ad quartum*, ubi de Romano Pontifice, haec ait: *Quis scit, si iste fuit baptizatus? & si ille, qui baptizavit eum, habuit intentionem conferendi Sacramentum Baptismi?* Caietanum secutus est Dominicus Bañez art. 10. dubit. 2. versu *ad secundum argumentum*: & alii apud P. Suarez disput. 10. sect. 5. num. 2. |  | **38.** That it is NOT to be believed as Catholic faith that this Pontiff is legitimate was clearly taught by Cajetan in Summa Theologica 2.2, question 1, article 3, in the section: *in response to the fourth*, where concerning the Roman Pontiff, he states: *Who knows whether this man was baptized? And whether the one who baptized him had the intention of conferring the Sacrament of Baptism?* Cajetan was followed by Dominic Bañez in article 10, doubt 2, in the section *to the second argument*: and others cited by Fr. Suárez in disputation 10, section 5, number 2. |
| **39.** Primus argumentum huius sententiae est, quia neque ex scriptura, neque ex traditione, neque ex definitione constare potest hunc esse legitimum Pontificem: ergo non est de fide eum esse talem. Confirmatur, quia non est de fide hunc hominem esse baptizatum: non enim constat de voluntate baptizantis: neque, est de fide eum esse legitime Sacerdotem, quia non constat ex fide de voluntate conferentis, aut recipientis ordines: ergo non potest constare ex fide eum esse Pontificem. |  | **39.** The first argument of this position is that neither from scripture, nor from tradition, nor from any definitive ruling can it be established that this person is the legitimate Pontiff: therefore it is not a matter of faith that he is such. This is confirmed because it is not a matter of faith that this man has been baptized: for the intention of the one baptizing is not certifiably known. Nor is it a matter of faith that he has been legitimately ordained a Priest, because the intention of the one conferring or receiving orders is not known with certainty from faith: therefore it cannot be established from faith that he is the Pontiff. |
| **40.** Primum ex hoc argumento ostendam huius sententiae absurditatem: demus enim oriri in Ecclesia controversiam aliquam fidei de aliquo articulo; & simul dicat altera pars contendentium non esse in Ecclesia legitimum Pontificem, qui componere possit eam controversiam, quia Paullus Quintus non est legitimus Pontifex. Spectat quidem ad Paullum Quintum definire, & articulum illum, & se esse legitimum Pontificem: utrunque enim definiri posse quis dubitat, cum hoc sit apprime necessarium ad tranquillitatem Ecclesiae: haec definitio contemnetur quidem in utraque parte, nisi aliunde constet de Pontificis legitimitate: qua enim ratione illam aestimabit, qui censet eum non esse Pontificem: ergo ante definitionem opus est, ut sit obligatio indubitanter credendi eum esse Pontificem, & habere potestatem definiendi. |  | **40.** First, I shall demonstrate the absurdity of this position from the following argument: let us suppose that some controversy of faith arises in the Church concerning a particular article; and simultaneously one of the contending parties asserts that there is no legitimate Pontiff in the Church who can resolve this controversy, because Paul V is not a legitimate Pontiff. Indeed, it pertains to Paul V to define both that article and that he is the legitimate Pontiff: for who can doubt that both matters can be defined, since this is exceedingly necessary for the tranquility of the Church. Yet this definition would certainly be despised by both parties unless the Pontiff’s legitimacy is established from other sources. For by what reasoning would one value it, who believes him not to be the Pontiff? Therefore, before any definition, there must exist an obligation to believe indubitably that he is the Pontiff and that he possesses the power of definition. |
| **41.** Praemitto doctrinam, quam late tradidi disp.12.ab initio: nempe in propositione universali affirmativa contineri omnes singulares: nempe hac propositione *omnis homo est conceptus in peccato*, continetur haec: *Petrus est conceptus in peccato, Ioannes est conceptus in peccato, &c.* ratio a priori: quia *omnis homo* est idem ac Petrus, & Paulus & caeteri: itaque Petrus, & Paulus sunt partes essentiales huius exempli *omnis homo*. Item quando Deus loquitur cum Propheta supponit a Propheta cognosci terminos quidditativos rerum: ut ostendi ea disp.12.§.17. nam supponit cognitionem quidditativam huius vocis *omnis homo*: quae cognitio quidditativa potest esse aut adaequata, aut inadaequata: adaequata terminatur ad omnes homines singulares, quia debet terminari ad omnes partes quidditativas: inadaequata vero debet terminari ad aliquem hominem in singulari: unde ad cognoscendum Petrum esse conceptum in peccato originali, non est opus hoc syllogismo: *omnis homo est conceptus in peccato: Petrus est homo: ergo Petrus est conceptus in peccato*. Ratio est, quia Petrus potest cognosci immediate in illa propositione universali ex solis apprehensionibus Petri, & omnis hominis. Positis enim illis apprehensionibus, & audita hac voce, *omnis homo est conceptus in peccato*, statim concipio de Petro dici conceptionem in peccato: & efformo hunc syllogismum: omne quod Deus dicit, est; sed dicit Petrum esse conceptum in peccato, ergo Petrus est conceptus in peccato: si autem aliquis interroget, ubi Deus id dicat de Petro? respondebo in illa propositione universali, omnis homo est conceptus: quae omnia late prosecutus sum ea disp. 2. sect. 2. ubi etiam ostendi propositionem hanc obiectivam, *Petrus est conceptus in peccato*, esse secundum se de fide, quia à Deo est immediate revelata: haec autem propositio formalis: *Petrus est conceptus in peccato*, potest esse vel ab habitu fidei immediate, vel à Theologico sub habitu fidei, quando deducitur per syllogismum, quem ultimo formavi in hoc §. ab habitu autem Theologico elicitur, quando in propositione universali, *omnis homo*, non cognoscitur explicite Petrus; sed indigeo nova illius cognitione per hanc novam minorem propositionem, *Petrus est homo*: de quo egi ea disputatione duodecima §. secundo. |  | **41.** I preface this with a doctrine which I have broadly transmitted in the 12th disputation from the beginning: namely, that in a universal affirmative proposition all singular instances are contained. For instance, in this proposition, *every man is conceived in sin*, this is contained: *Peter is conceived in sin, John is conceived in sin, etc.* The a priori reason is because *every man* is the same as Peter, and Paul, and all others. Thus, Peter and Paul are essential parts of this example, *every man*. Similarly, when God speaks with a Prophet, He presupposes that the Prophet knows the quidditative terms of things, as I demonstrated in that 12th disputation, §17. For He presupposes a quidditative knowledge of this phrase *every man*: which quidditative knowledge can be either adequate or inadequate. Adequate knowledge extends to all individual men, because it must extend to all quidditative parts. Inadequate knowledge, however, must extend to some individual man. Thus, to know that Peter was conceived in original sin, there is no need for this syllogism: *every man is conceived in sin; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is conceived in sin*. The reason is that Peter can be known immediately in that universal proposition from the apprehensions of Peter and of every man alone. For with these apprehensions in place, and having heard this statement, *every man is conceived in sin*, I immediately conceive that conception in sin is being said of Peter, and I form this syllogism: everything that God says is true; but He says that Peter is conceived in sin; therefore Peter is conceived in sin. If someone should ask where God says this about Peter, I will respond: in that universal proposition, every man is conceived [in sin]. All of which I have pursued at length in that 2nd disputation, section 2, where I also showed that this objective proposition, *Peter is conceived in sin*, is according to itself a matter of faith, because it is immediately revealed by God. This formal proposition, however, *Peter is conceived in sin*, can proceed either immediately from the habit of faith, or from theological habit under the habit of faith, when it is deduced through the syllogism which I formulated at the end of this section. It is elicited from theological habit, however, when in the universal proposition *every man*, Peter is not explicitly recognized, but I need a new cognition of him through this new minor proposition, *Peter is a man*: which I discussed in that twelfth disputation, second section. |
| **42.** Premitto secundo, quando Christus Matthaei 16. dixit Petro *tibi dabo claves regni Calorum*: & quando Ioannis 21. dixit: *pasce oves meas*, illam promissionem non fuisse factam soli personae Petri; sed illi & omnibus eius successoribus; quemadmodum potestas consecrandi & absolvendi non fuit data solis Apostolis; sed eorum etiam successoribus. Ponamus igitur Paulum Quintum esse legitimum successorem Petri, de illo dixit Christus: *pasce oves meas, tibi dabo claves Calorum*: quemadmodum si ego sum legitimus Sacerdos, mihi dixit Christus, *fac hoc in meam commemorationem*. Itaque hae promissiones sunt privilegia universalia, quibus Deus donavit Petrum & Apostolos, & eorum successores: & tam proprie, & immediate successores, quàm Apostolos ipsos. Aliquando enim Apostolos, efformavit propositionem universalem immediate significantem successores: ut Rex alloquens militem, eum & eius successores nobilitate, & pecuniis annuis donat, quae donatio fit immediate successoribus; licet sermo dirigatur ad solum militem praesentem. |  | **42.** I premise secondly, when Christ in Matthew 16 said to Peter, *“I will give you the keys of the kingdom of Heaven”*: and when in John 21 He said: *“feed my sheep”*, that promise was not made to the person of Peter alone; but to him and all his successors; just as the power of consecrating and absolving was not given to the Apostles alone; but also to their successors. Let us suppose, therefore, that Paul V is the legitimate successor of Peter, of him Christ said: *“feed my sheep, I will give you the keys of Heaven”*: just as if I am a legitimate Priest, Christ said to me, *“do this in remembrance of me”*. Thus these promises are universal privileges, with which God endowed Peter and the Apostles, and their successors: and as properly and immediately to the successors as to the Apostles themselves. For sometimes addressing the Apostles, He formed a universal proposition immediately signifying the successors: as a King addressing a soldier, grants to him and his successors nobility and annual stipends, which donation is made immediately to the successors; although the speech is directed to the sole soldier present. |
| **43.** Pono tertio, pertinere ad speciale providentiam Dei cum sua Ecclesia, non permittere, ut tota illa conspiret in aliquem errorem, ex quo contra illam possint praevalere portae inferi: quia, qui promisit eas portas non praevalituras adversus Ecclesiam, promisit etiam avertere, quidquid posset esse occasio, ut tartareae portae praevalent: una autem ex praecipuis occasionibus harum portarum de Ecclesia victoriae esset carere vero, & legitimo Pontifice, & pro illo pacifice subrogari PseudoPontificem: quia pascendas Christus voluit oves per Petrum, & eius successores: quemadmodum membra gubernat per caput: unde si tota Ecclesia pacifice admitteret aliquem PseudoPontificem, exponeretur gravissimis incommodis in fide, & moribus, quia exponeretur periculo accipiendi pro oraculis doctrinam falsam, & turpem administrationem, quia ille Pontifex ageret proprio Marte, & non Dei. Ergo authoritas humana totius Ecclesiae non potuit falli moraliter in acceptando obscura revelatione Dei: ita nec in acceptando Pontifice: ex qua acceptatione cognoscimus & illum esse Pontificem, & habere omnes intrinsecas conditiones ad id munus, ut colligimus esse revelationem, & omnes eius conditiones, quando a tota Ecclesia proponitur. |  | **43.** I posit thirdly, that it pertains to God’s special providence with His Church, not to permit that the entire Church should conspire in some error from which the gates of hell might prevail against it: because He who promised that those gates would not prevail against the Church also promised to avert whatever might be an occasion for the infernal gates to prevail. Now, one of the principal occasions for the victory of these gates over the Church would be to lack a true and legitimate Pontiff, and to have a Pseudo-Pontiff peacefully substituted in his place: because Christ willed that the sheep be pastured by Peter and his successors, just as He governs the members through the head. Hence, if the whole Church were to peacefully admit some Pseudo-Pontiff, it would be exposed to the gravest dangers in faith and morals, because it would be exposed to the peril of accepting false doctrine as oracles, and a disgraceful administration, since that Pontiff would act by his own power, and not God’s. Therefore, the human authority of the whole Church could not be morally deceived in accepting an obscure revelation of God; likewise, neither in accepting a Pontiff. From this acceptance, we recognize both that he is the Pontiff and that he possesses all the intrinsic conditions for that office, just as we deduce that something is a revelation, with all its conditions, when it is proposed by the whole Church. |
| **44.** Dices, Ecclesiam non posse errare in credendo: fateor, quia non potest errare in admittendo pacifice universali Pastore illegitimo: habens enim legitimum, accipit pastum veritatis, & influxum Spiritus Sancti per Petrum, super quem fundatur: at vero si posset errare in pacifica recognitione Pastoris, posset etiam errare in credendo: quare ex uno, impossibili sequitur aliud: & e contrario, ex infallibilitate Pastoris sequitur infallibilitas doctrinae, & fidei: est igitur certum signum legitimi Pastoris, eius legitima electio, & pacificus in eam Ecclesiae consensus: ita ut, vel nulla sit inter Catholicos dissensio; quae si est, sit in contradicentibus absque ullo probabili fundamento; vel si est, merito possint prohabitudinis lege puniri: quando vero est probabile fundamentum dubitandi de legitimitate Pontificis, quamvis re ipsa legitimus sit; tamen non creditur fide Catholica, nec eius legitimitas, & consequenter nec eius definitio: quia quoties est probabile fundamentum, possumus prudenter dubitare; quamdiu autem ita possumus dubitare, non possumus credere fide Catholica. Quapropter tunc pertinet ad Ecclesiam non quiescere, donec aperte constet de legitima electione, & acceptatione Pontificis. Quod si aliter id obtineri non potest, nisi Pontificem, aut Pontifices deponendo, id potest efficere: ut contigit in Concilio Constantiensi inchoato anno millesimo quadringentesimo decimoquarto: ubi Ioannes vigesimus tertius, & Benedictus decimus tertius, & Gregorius duodecimus fuerunt depositi a Summo Pontificatu, & creatus fuit Martinus V. dum enim non constat sine probabili controversia de legitimitate Pontificis, potest Ecclesia eum deponere, ut docet Pater Suarez libro tertio, cap. 18. numero octavo: quamvis eo iure careat in Pontifices legitimos, & sine probabili controversia acceptos. |  | **44.** You will say that the Church cannot err in belief: I acknowledge this, because it cannot err in peacefully accepting an illegitimate universal Pastor. For having a legitimate Pastor, it receives the nourishment of truth and the influence of the Holy Spirit through Peter, upon whom it is founded. But if it could err in the peaceful recognition of a Pastor, it could also err in belief. Therefore, from one impossibility follows another, and conversely, from the infallibility of the Pastor follows the infallibility of doctrine and faith. Thus, the legitimate election of a Pastor and the peaceful consent of the Church to it are certain signs of a legitimate Pastor—such that either there is no dissension among Catholics, or if there is, it exists among those who contradict without any probable foundation; or if dissension exists, they can deservedly be punished according to the law of probability. However, when there is a probable foundation for doubting the legitimacy of a Pontiff, even if he might be legitimate in reality, nevertheless neither his legitimacy nor consequently his definitions are believed with Catholic faith. This is because whenever there is a probable foundation, we can prudently doubt; and as long as we can thus doubt, we cannot believe with Catholic faith. Therefore, at such times it is incumbent upon the Church not to rest until it clearly establishes the legitimate election and acceptance of the Pontiff. And if this cannot be obtained otherwise except by deposing the Pontiff or Pontiffs, it can accomplish this—as happened in the Council of Constance, which began in the year one thousand four hundred and fourteen, where John XXIII, Benedict XIII, and Gregory XII were deposed from the Supreme Pontificate, and Martin V was created. For as long as the legitimacy of a Pontiff is not established without probable controversy, the Church can depose him, as Father Suarez teaches in book three, chapter 18, number eight—although it lacks this right with respect to legitimate Pontiffs who have been accepted without probable controversy. |
| **45.** Hinc respondetur ad argumentum propositum §. 39. negato antecedenti: constat enim hunc esse legitimum Pontificem ex illis Scripturae testimonijs, quibus solet Petri confirmari primatus: quia illa est promissio universalis, qua immediate continentur omnes legitimi successores, de quos Deus singillatim vidit, & de illis locutus est; & qui nobis noscendi erant per evidentiam moralem ex legitima illorum electione, & acceptatione pacifica. Quemadmodum, quando Deus revelavit omnem hominem conceptum iri in peccato originali, locutus est Deus immediate de Petro & Paulo, quos Deus clare cognovit, & a nobis erant cognoscendi per evidentiam physicam ortam ex sensibus: & quemadmodum cognito Petro, & cognita universali revelatione de conceptione omnis hominis in peccato, video ex sola apprehensione terminorum, Deum locutum de Petro, & Paulo; ita visa promissione universali Dei de omnibus successoribus Petri, & visa evidenter legitima electione, & approbatione Pontificis: video hunc esse legitimum successorem Petri, & de ipso locutum esse Christum. Recognosce §. 41. & 42. |  | **45.** Hence, we respond to the argument proposed in §. 39 by denying the antecedent: for it is established that this is the legitimate Pontiff from those testimonies of Scripture by which the primacy of Peter is customarily confirmed. This is because that promise is universal, immediately including all legitimate successors, whom God has individually foreseen and spoken about; and who were to be recognized by us through moral certainty arising from their legitimate election and peaceful acceptance. Just as when God revealed that every human would be conceived in original sin, God spoke immediately about Peter and Paul, whom God clearly knew, and who were to be known by us through physical evidence arising from the senses. And just as, having known Peter and having known the universal revelation concerning the conception of every human in sin, I see from the mere apprehension of the terms that God spoke about Peter and Paul; so too, having seen the universal promise of God concerning all successors of Peter, and having clearly seen the legitimate election and approval of the Pontiff, I see that this one is the legitimate successor of Peter, and that Christ spoke about him. Review §. 41 and 42. |
| **46.** Dices, a nobis videri & evidenter cognosci evidentiam physicam, & ad sensum, legitimam electionem, & acceptationem pacificam quoad haec externa; non tamen quoad interna. Nescimus enim an sit baptizatus, & an Sacerdos? ergo non constat certo de tota electione legitima. Confirmatur exemplo Sacerdotis consecrantis hostiam: quia omnia, quae externe requiruntur ad legitimam consecrationem, videmus: nempe eum ordines suscepisse, & consecrationis verba proferre: tamen non sumus certi fide Catholica de consecratione huius hostiae; quia non sumus certi de eius Sacerdotio, & intentione consecrandi. Respondeo ex §. quadragesimo tertio, spectare ad specialem providentiam Dei in Ecclesiam non permittere eligi & admitti pacifice eum, qui non possit esse legitime Pontifex: Quare ex evidenti cognitione legitimae electionis & acceptationis pacifice, colligitur hunc certum hominem nullo alio requisito ad Pontificatum: atque Deum commisisse Pontificium Sancti Petri. Itaque ex applicatione per se nota, deducimus actum fidei, quo credimus illi successori S. Petri collatam ipsius Petri potestatem: quemadmodum ex evidenti cognitione Petri colligimus eius conceptionem in peccato. Quae asseruntur de privato Sacerdote non urgent: quia non promisit Deus eam specialem providentiam in hos casus privatos: quia vero est leviora momenti, & quae absque praeiudicio fidei potest contingere; secus autem electio Pseudo Pontificis. |  | **46.** You will say that we seem to see and evidently recognize with physical evidence, perceptible to the senses, the legitimate election and peaceful acceptance regarding these external matters; but not regarding internal matters. For we do not know whether he is baptized, and whether he is a Priest. Therefore, there is no certain evidence about the complete legitimacy of the election. This is confirmed by the example of a Priest consecrating the host: because we see all things that are externally required for legitimate consecration, namely that he has received orders and pronounces the words of consecration; nevertheless, we are not certain by Catholic faith about the consecration of this host, because we are not certain about his Priesthood and intention to consecrate. I respond from paragraph forty-three that it pertains to God’s special providence over the Church not to permit the election and peaceful acceptance of one who cannot legitimately be Pontiff. Therefore, from the evident recognition of a legitimate election and peaceful acceptance, it is deduced that this specific man requires nothing else for the Pontificate, and that God has entrusted to him the Pontifical Office of Saint Peter. And so, from this self-evident application, we deduce an act of faith by which we believe that the power of Peter himself has been conferred on that successor of St. Peter—just as from the evident knowledge of Peter, we infer his conception in sin. The arguments concerning a private Priest are not compelling, because God has not promised that special providence in these private cases, as they are of lesser importance and can occur without prejudice to the faith; but the election of a Pseudo-Pontiff is quite different. |
| **47.** Dices: ergo Urbanum VIII. esse Pontificem colligitur ex duabus propositionibus fidei, ex hac: *Omnis rite electus est Pontifex*, & ex hac. *Hic est rite electus*: quam huius Canonicam electionem cognoscimus ex consensu totius Ecclesiae. Contra me quid inde? concedamus id fieri divinae id quod pone, quas libuerit propositiones. Tamen Ecclesiae consensus non est revelatio; sed applicatio, ut per illam cognoscamus Dominum nostrum Urbanum contineri in eo subiecto, *omnis rite electus*: & de illo loquutum Christum Dominum, cum loquutus fuit S. Petro. Nam Ecclesia authoritate humana moraliter infallibili applicat nobis revelationes Dei: quibus sic applicatis non possumus absque peccato diffidere (ut abunde ostendi): ergo haec applicatio revelationis, nec est revelatio, nec creditur divina fide; sed est conditio sine qua non: & creditur fide humana moraliter certa & nos immediate ad assentiendum fide divina revelationi, quam applicat. Ecclesia igitur authoritate humana applicat nobis Canonicam electionem Urbani: qua applicatione credimus fide humana moraliter certa, Urbanum esse rite electum, & esse partem huius subiecti: *Omnis rite electus*, ut scientia naturali credimus Petrum esse hominem & partem huius subiecti, *omnis homo*. Qua cognitione existente in intellectu, si audimus, *omnis rite electus est Pontifex*: credimus Pontificatum immediate & formaliter dici de Urbano: quia sumus moraliter certi, eum esse partem eius subiecti, *omnis rite electus*, ut existente cognitione evidenti de Petro homine; accepta ex physicis principiis: si audimus, *omnis homo est conceptus in peccato*: videmus clare peccatum immediate, & formaliter dici de Petro, quem videmus clare esse partem eius subiecti, *omnis homo*. |  | **47.** You will say: therefore that Urban VIII is the Pontiff is deduced from two propositions of faith, from this one: *Everyone who is duly elected is Pontiff*, and from this one: *This man is duly elected*; and we recognize his Canonical election from the consensus of the whole Church. Against me, what follows from this? Let us concede that this happens by divine means, which you posit, whichever propositions you please. Nevertheless, the consensus of the Church is not revelation, but an application, so that through it we may recognize our Lord Urban to be contained in that subject, *everyone who is duly elected*; and that Christ the Lord spoke of him, when He spoke to St. Peter. For the Church, with morally infallible human authority, applies to us the revelations of God, which, once so applied, we cannot distrust without sin (as I have abundantly demonstrated). Therefore, this application of revelation is neither revelation itself nor believed by divine faith, but is a condition sine qua non, and is believed with human faith that is morally certain, and leads us immediately to assent with divine faith to the revelation which it applies. The Church, therefore, by human authority, applies to us the Canonical election of Urban: by this application we believe with morally certain human faith that Urban is duly elected, and is part of this subject: *everyone who is duly elected*, just as by natural knowledge we believe Peter is a man and part of this subject, *every man*. With this knowledge existing in the intellect, if we hear, *everyone who is duly elected is Pontiff*, we believe that the Pontificate is immediately and formally predicated of Urban, because we are morally certain that he is part of that subject, *everyone who is duly elected*, just as with the evident knowledge of Peter as a man, derived from physical principles: if we hear, *every man is conceived in sin*, we clearly see sin immediately and formally predicated of Peter, whom we clearly see to be part of that subject, *every man*. |
| **48.** Ecclesiae autem humanam satis esse, ut simus certi moraliter Urbanum esse rite electum & esse partem huius subiecti, *omnis rite electus*, constat: quia ea authoritas nos reddit moraliter certos de existentia revelationis de qua (ut saepe probavi), sed eadem est ratio in proponenda Canonica electione, de qua agimus, & omnibus eius conditionibus obscuris: ergo, ut est satis ad evidentiam moralem circa revelationem; est satis circa electionem: Probo minorem: quia infallibilitas circa revelationes pendet ab infallibilitate circa electionem: ergo est eadem ratio. Probo minorem: quia revelationes, aut proponuntur, aut confirmantur authoritate veri Pontificis, & quas ipse proponit iure Pontificio, tenetur credere reliquum Ecclesiae corpus. Itaque perinde est Ecclesiam esse moraliter infallibilem circa revelationes, ac circa Pontificem, qui est illarum iudex. |  | **48.** It is evident that human authority of the Church is sufficient for us to be morally certain that Urban was legitimately elected and is part of this subject, *all legitimately elected*: because that authority renders us morally certain about the existence of revelation (as I have often proven), and the same reasoning applies in proposing a Canonical election, which we are discussing, and all its obscure conditions. Therefore, just as it is sufficient for moral certainty regarding revelation, so it is sufficient regarding the election. I prove the minor premise: because infallibility concerning revelations depends on infallibility concerning election; therefore, the reasoning is the same. I prove the minor premise: because revelations are either proposed or confirmed by the authority of the true Pontiff, and what he proposes by Pontifical right, the rest of the body of the Church is bound to believe. Thus, for the Church to be morally infallible regarding revelations is equivalent to it being morally infallible regarding the Pontiff, who is the judge of those revelations. |
| **49.** Unde evidenter infertur, non esse specialem difficultatem in hac mea sententia de legitimitate huius Papae: quae non sit communis Conciliis generalibus, toti Ecclesiae, & singulis revelationibus Catholice creditis. Quod utinam animadvertissent oppositae sententiae assertores. Igitur, partim ex electione visibili; partim ex pacifica Ecclesiae acceptatione habemus assensum moraliter evidentem, quem sine peccato negare non possumus, Urbanum esse rite electum, esse Sacerdotem, & esse partem huius subiecti, *omnis rite electus*: ut ex Physica scimus Petrum esse hominem, & partem huius subiecti, *Omnis homo*, & ut sine alia demonstratione de fide diffinita in hac, *omnis homo est conceptus in peccato*, credimus fide Catholica Petrum ita esse conceptum: ita credimus eadem fide Catholica, Urbanum esse Pontificem. |  | **49.** From this it is clearly inferred that there is no special difficulty in my position regarding the legitimacy of this Pope that is not common to General Councils, the whole Church, and individual revelations believed as Catholic. Would that the proponents of the opposing view had observed this. Therefore, partly from the visible election and partly from the peaceful acceptance by the Church, we have a morally evident assent, which we cannot deny without sin, that Urban was duly elected, is a Priest, and is part of this subject, *every duly elected [Pope]*: just as from Natural Philosophy we know that Peter is a man, and part of this subject, *Every man*, and just as without further demonstration concerning the faith defined in this proposition, *every man is conceived in sin*, we believe with Catholic faith that Peter was so conceived; in the same way we believe with the same Catholic faith that Urban is Pontiff. |
| **50.** Dices, nos cognoscere evidenter & Petrum esse hominem, & partem eius subiecti, *omnis homo*. At non cognoscimus evidenter Urbanum esse electum, nec partem huius subiecti, *omnis rite electus*: ergo non spectat ad fidem Catholicam, quia possumus in eo iudicio falli. Nego consequentiam: ad probationem respondeo, nos etiam posse falli in iudicio, quod hoc individuum sit homo: sufficit tamen evidentia physica; licet sic exposita errori ob offusam dispositionem, […] ita ex evidentia morali scio Urbanum esse rite electum, & partem huius subiecti, *omnis rite electus*: ergo sufficit evidentia moralis, ut sufficit ad credendum Concilium Tridentinum coactum legitime: & hos homines, qui sciunt Ecclesiam, esse Catholicos: & ad credendum Caesares fuisse, & fuisse in peccato conceptos: & quod caput est, sufficit eadem Ecclesiae humana authoritas ad faciendas revelationes credibiles evidenter: eadem omnino ratione sufficit ad faciendam evidenter credibilem legitimam electionem Urbani. |  | **50.** You might say that we know with evidence both that Peter is a man and that he is part of the subject “every man.” But we do not evidently know that Urban is elected, nor that he is part of the subject “every legitimately elected person”; therefore, this does not pertain to the Catholic faith, because we can be mistaken in that judgment. I deny the conclusion. In response to the proof, I answer that we can also be mistaken in judging that this individual is a human being; yet physical evidence suffices, although it may be exposed to error due to obscured disposition, […] similarly, from moral evidence I know Urban is legitimately elected, and part of the subject “every legitimately elected person.” Therefore, moral evidence suffices, just as it suffices for believing that the Council of Trent was legitimately convened; and that these men who know the Church are Catholics; and for believing that Caesars existed and were conceived in sin. What is most important, this same human authority of the Church suffices to make revelations evidently credible: in precisely the same way, it suffices to make the legitimate election of Urban evidently credible. |
| **51.** Ergo, uno verbo, Urbanum esse Papam, credo fide divina, non hoc syllogismo: *Omnis rite electus est Papa: Urbanus est rite electus; ergo Urbanus est Papa*, ut non credo, Petrum esse conceptum in peccato, hoc syllogismo. Omnis homo est conceptus in peccato, Petrus est homo ergo Petrus est conceptus in peccato; sed credo hoc syllogismo: Omne quod Deus dicit est, sed dicit Urbanum esse Papam, & Petrum in peccato conceptum: ergo & Urbanum est Papa, & Petrus in peccato conceptus. Si autem quaeras, ubi Deus dixerit Petrum in peccato conceptum, & Urbanum Papa esse? respondeo, in illa propositione, omnis homo est conceptus in peccato, omnis rite electus est Papa: quia ex terminis per se notis physice, aut moraliter cognosco, Petrum esse hominem, & de illo dici quicquid de omni homine; & Urbanum esse electum, & de illo dici quicquid de omni rite electo. Haec fusius disserui, ut metum abigam ex aliquorum animis, dubitantium qua ratione haec doctrina posit defendi, cum non sit de fide Urbanum esse rite electum? dico, nec est de fide Petrum esse hominem; aut hominem animal rationale; aut hac voce homo significari verum hominem. Illi enim termini aliunde noti ponuntur a fide: & de illis tic praecognitis loquitur Deus, ut nos loquimur: non enim dico tibi: hic est tuus frater, sed pono id ate cognitum, & dico: tuus frater fecit hoc. Vide disp. 1, sect. 1, 2, & quae enim ibi dixi de propositione universali per se nota physice, aut moraliter, huic applicantur iisdem terminis. |  | **51.** Therefore, in a word, I believe with divine faith that Urban is Pope, not by this syllogism: *Every properly elected person is Pope: Urban is properly elected; therefore Urban is Pope*, just as I do not believe that Peter was conceived in sin by this syllogism: Every human is conceived in sin, Peter is human, therefore Peter is conceived in sin; but I believe by this syllogism: Everything that God says is true, but He says Urban is Pope, and Peter was conceived in sin: therefore both Urban is Pope, and Peter was conceived in sin. But if you ask where God has said that Peter was conceived in sin, and that Urban is Pope, I respond: in this proposition, “every human is conceived in sin,” and “everyone properly elected is Pope”—because from terms that are self-evident either physically or morally, I know that Peter is human, and whatever is said of all humans is said of him; and that Urban is elected, and whatever is said of all properly elected persons is said of him. I have discussed this at greater length to dispel fear from the minds of some who doubt how this doctrine can be defended, since it is not a matter of faith that Urban was properly elected. I say that it is also not a matter of faith that Peter is human; or that a human is a rational animal; or that by the word “human” a true human is signified. For those terms, known from elsewhere, are presumed by faith: and God speaks about these things, which are thus foreknown, just as we speak: for I do not say to you: “this is your brother,” but I presuppose that is known by you, and say: “your brother did this.” See disputation 1, section 1, 2, and what I said there about a universal proposition that is self-evident physically or morally applies here in the same terms. |
| **52.** Secundum argumentum: quia contigit aliquando legitima electio Pontificis, & acceptatio pacifica in persona incapaci Pontificatus: ergo & haec non sunt certus character electionis internae: probo antecedens ex Martino Polono, & Mariano Scoto asserentibus anno 853. electam faeminam in Pontificem Romanum, quae vocata est Ioannes Octavus, quae successit Leoni Quarto ante Benedictum Tertium. Nego antecedens: ad probationem respondeo illam esse fabulam plus quam anilem: quod, qualesoles eruditione, comprobat Cardinalis Bellarminus libro tertio de Romano Pontifice capite 24 ostendens authores eius temporis nec meminisse huius historiae; quod est argumentum liquidissimum evidentis eius falsitatis. Platina, Sigebertus, & Marianus Scotus id acceperunt ex Martino Polono; scriptore quidem nonnullis annorum centuriis posteriore: deinde homine simplici & pene stulto, qui nonnullas alias fabulas leviter creditas venditavit; quem errorem ex Chronologia, ex antiquis Scriptoribus, & aliis argumentis evidentibus confutat Bellarminus, fabulam illam referens in Constantinopolitanam Ecclesiam: in qua electi fuerant eunuchi nonnulli, & fama percrebruit etiam fuisse feminam electam: quod constat ex Leone Nono reprehendente propterea illam consuetudinem eligendi eunuchos. Baronius tomo decimo anno 853. probare conatur, neque Constantinopoli foeminam electam: qui etiam rem hanc tractat erudite; nescio autem cur censeat primum huius fabulae authorem Marianum Scotum, cum fuerit Martinus Polonus. |  | **52.** The second argument: because sometimes a legitimate election of a Pontiff occurs, with peaceful acceptance, in a person incapable of the Pontificate; therefore, these are not certain indicators of an internal election. I prove the antecedent from Martin of Poland and Marianus Scotus, who assert that in the year 853, a woman was elected as Roman Pontiff, who was called John VIII, who succeeded Leo IV before Benedict III. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I respond that this is more than an old wives’ tale. Cardinal Bellarmine, with his customary erudition, confirms this in the third book of “De Romano Pontifice,” chapter 24, showing that authors of that time made no mention of this story, which is the clearest evidence of its obvious falsity. Platina, Sigebert, and Marianus Scotus received this from Martin of Poland, a writer indeed several centuries later, and moreover a simple and almost foolish man, who peddled several other carelessly believed fables. Bellarmine refutes this error through chronology, ancient writers, and other evident arguments, attributing that fable to the Constantinopolitan Church, in which certain eunuchs had been elected, and a rumor spread that even a woman had been elected, which is evident from Leo IX’s rebuke of that custom of electing eunuchs. Baronius, in volume ten, year 853, attempts to prove that not even in Constantinople was a woman elected. He also treats this matter eruditely; I do not know, however, why he considers Marianus Scotus the first author of this fable, when it was Martin of Poland. |
| **53.** Tertium argumentum est, quia de legitima electione Formosi varii fuere summi Pontifices: etenim Stephanus Sextus censuit Formosum non fuisse legitime electum: Ioannes autem Nonus, eumdem Formosum dixit fuisse legitime electum. Postea Sergius Tertius, consensit cum Stephano Sexto. Deinceps caeteri Pontifices consenserunt cum Ioanne Nono. Respondeo hinc nihil contra nos. Primum, quia dum fuit illa probabilis controversia, non fuit de fide Formosum fuisse Papam: quia cum ipse iurasset se non rediturum ad Pontificalem dignitatem; & de eius absolutione dubii essent Stephanus & Sergius: habuerunt probabilem occasionem dubitandi. Secundo, quia Stephanus & Sergius non erraverunt intellectu; sed ira perciti ob inimicitias cum Formoso omnia eius acta irritaverunt, declarantes ordines sacros invalide susceptos; quos ipse contulerat. Non quod existimarent eos esse nullos; sed quod eum voluerunt infamare: &, ut in hoc peccaverunt; peccare potuerunt in primo. |  | **53.** The third argument is that various Supreme Pontiffs had different views regarding the legitimate election of Formosus: for Stephen VI judged that Formosus had not been legitimately elected, while John IX declared that the same Formosus had been legitimately elected. Afterwards, Sergius III agreed with Stephen VI. Subsequently, the remaining Pontiffs concurred with John IX. I respond that this proves nothing against our position. First, because while that controversy remained probable, it was not a matter of faith that Formosus was Pope: since he himself had sworn not to return to the pontifical dignity, and Stephen and Sergius were doubtful about his absolution from this oath, they had reasonable grounds for doubt. Second, because Stephen and Sergius did not err intellectually, but rather, driven by anger due to their enmities with Formosus, they nullified all his acts, declaring invalid the holy orders he had conferred. Not because they truly believed these ordinations to be null, but because they wished to defame him; and just as they sinned in this matter, they could have sinned in the first. |
| **54.** Obiicis, asseri a Cardinali Bellarmino eos errare potuisse in quaestionibus facti tom. 1. lib. 4. de Romano Pontifice c. 14. §. succedet Ceset ergo Bellarminus eam quaestionem non spectare ad fidem. Primum transeat consequens. Secundo distinguo consequens: non pertinet ad fidem ante pacificam ab Ecclesia acceptationem, transeat consequens: post eam, nego consequentiam: & sic intellige nostrum Cardinalem. |  | **54.** You object that Cardinal Bellarmine asserts they could have erred in questions of fact, in volume 1, book 4 of his work “On the Roman Pontiff,” chapter 14, § “It follows.” Bellarmine therefore considers that question not to pertain to faith. First, let the consequence stand. Second, I distinguish the consequent: it does not pertain to faith before peaceful acceptance by the Church—let the consequence stand; after such acceptance, I deny the consequence. And thus should our Cardinal be understood. |